Obama shares the American consensus that America is committed to Israel – its existence, right to security and self-defense, and prosperity – based on the Judeo-Christian Biblical heritage, the democratic values of the two countries, and common strategic interests. He supports the two-state solution, is committed to making every effort to promote peace in the region, and already on the second day in office again excluded Hamas as a partner for dialogue as long as it fails to meet the well known conditions laid down by the international community.
Nonetheless, beyond these basic views, the president presents a balanced position that stands out on the American political scene by virtue of its evenhandedness. Obama promised that his administration would help “Israelis to identify and strengthen those partners who are truly committed to peace,” a diplomatic formulation for the notion of applying pressure. Indeed, when before his election the president spoke of concrete steps, he specified only demands of Israel regarding the roadblocks and the settlements. He did not mention any demands of the Palestinians, such as fighting terrorism or legislative reforms. He also has often stressed “Palestinian suffering,” demonstrating a definite sensitivity for this issue. Thus, one of the changes the new president brings is a new balance between Israel’s security needs and its right to self-defense on the one hand, and the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians and their right to freedom on the other.
Mitchell’s appointment reflects this posture. First, Mitchell, former Democratic Senate majority leader, is a man of significant political stature as well as of international standing (as successful mediator in the Northern Ireland conflict), a standing more distinguished than that of professional diplomats such as Dennis Ross and others. He therefore stands to enjoy greater freedom of action while his superiors are busy with other international issues. Mitchell is very highly regarded as having played a critical role in attaining the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998 thanks to his commitment, patience, energy, and deep understanding of the situation. Second, because his appointment came just two days after Obama’s inauguration and he was immediately dispatched to the Middle East, Obama is keeping his promise to be actively involved in the conflict early in his term. Third, it has surely not escaped the president, who referred directly to “the Muslim world” in his inauguration speech, that an Arab-American (as Mitchell defines himself because of his Lebanese Marronite mother) is assuming a role in the diplomatic process that was hitherto largely filled by Jewish Americans. And fourth, Mitchell proved to be impeccably balanced when he headed the 2000-2001 international committee investigating the outbreak of the second intifada. In the famous Mitchell Report, he divided the responsibility equally between the two sides, and invented ex nihilo the connection between a Palestinian struggle against terrorism and an Israeli freeze on the settlements. (In the Oslo accords, the Palestinian obligation to combat terrorism is explicitly mentioned, but there is no hint of an Israeli commitment of any sort regarding the settlements.) From the Palestinian and Arab world’s point of view – so far so good.
When he was appointed, Mitchell declared, not for the first time, that “there is no conflict that cannot be ended.” This statement is reminiscent of Kissinger’s critical analysis that American foreign policy is characterized by a pragmatic-legalistic approach, as if all problems could be solved if only people sat down and talked about them, as if there are no irresolvable problems or at least irresolvable according to an American timetable and/or in an American style. In this context, it is worth remembering that the leading trio – Obama, Clinton, and Mitchell – are all jurists. In any case, Mitchell sees not inconsiderable similarity between the conflict in Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinian one. Therefore, it stands to reason that the main lessons he learned from Ireland, as he documented in 2007, point to his expected direction: building trust before taking ambitious steps through mutual, simultaneous efforts; public finger-pointing for not meeting the challenges, and sanctions in response to unacceptable regressions; improving the texture of civilian-economic life critical to the success of the peace process; and including violent groups in the process, even at the cost of slowing it down, in order to increase legitimacy and support. On the basis of his record and the administration's professed urgency, it seems possible to sketch an initial outline of America’s coming conduct with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In the coming two months, Mitchell will focus on Gaza because of its immediacy and the need to wait for a new Israeli government to form. President Obama spoke of the need to reopen the Gaza crossings and rehabilitate the area, albeit not with Hamas but with the Palestinian Authority and under European supervision. Nonetheless, even if Hamas does agree to the PA’s involvement, it will not agree to complete self-neutralization. A joint crossings agreement between Hamas and the PA on its own, let alone as a precursor to or part of the establishment of a unity government, will create a problem for the Obama administration in terms of disqualifying the organization as a legitimate partner to the process. As even the Bush administration more than tacitly accepted the inclusion of Hizbollah in the Lebanese government (as a partner with veto rights, no less), it is hard to believe that the dialogue-seeking Obama administration will not find a way to ignore and/or bypass the policy of ostracism.
Assuming that at some point the sides will return to the Annapolis framework, one may expect two innovations. In the immediate day-to-day track of the obligations included in the first stage of the Roadmap (itself based to a large extent on the Mitchell Report), the administration will strive to create a mechanism to supervise the fulfillment of these commitments. Even without such a mechanism, it is very possible that Obama will show less patience than showed by his predecessor for Israeli foot-dragging on the settlements, outposts, and crossings, and less patience than he may show for Palestinian foot-dragging on its combating terrorism and instituting governmental reforms. Regarding negotiations over a permanent settlement, the president’s sense of urgency and the envoy's Irish experience will make themselves felt. There will be no more Bush- and Rice-like waiting for the sides to inch forward. In presenting its own mediation proposals, the United States will likely prefer the Carter model and not the later Clinton one. In terms of contents, the starting point for American stances will likely be the Clinton parameters from late 2000. All of this is in keeping with the president’s vow two days after his inauguration of “active and aggressive involvement.”
Flexibility towards Hamas in order to rehabilitate Gaza and maybe even to allow Abu Mazen joint governing; concrete strict demands regarding Israel’s conduct in the West Bank; partial or full adoption of the Arab initiative in which the president sees “constructive elements”; and insistent involvement in negotiations over the permanent settlement – none of these will be to the liking of any Israeli government, not even a Kadima-headed center-left government that includes at least one right-wing party. A delicate American attempt to affect the composition of the next government is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. Diplomatic courtesy, especially between two nations as close to one another as Israel and the United States, demands that America wait until the democratic process in Israel is fully completed. However, if the figure forming the government has the option of choosing between a relatively hawkish composition and a relatively dovish one, the administration could conceivably leak something about its initiatives in order to hint that a hawkish government might have a problem with Israel’s ally. Therefore, we may expect cloudy to stormy weather – depending on the outcome of the Israeli elections – in the relations between Israel and the United States.
