The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution on March 2nd that imposes tough new sanctions and tightens some of its existing measures against North Korea. Resolution 2270 (2016) was the Security Council’s latest and strongest response to the rogue North Korean regime’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile-related test activities in violation of a series of prior Security Council resolutions. Led by the United States, which collaborated extensively with China to reach an agreed upon text, fifty member states co-sponsored the resolution, including ten members of the Security Council.
On paper at least, the Security Council finally accomplished something of substance in dealing with North Korea’s long-standing provocations and threats to international peace and security. President Obama issued a statement following the vote that highlighted his belief in the importance of the resolution: “Today, the international community, speaking with one voice, has sent Pyongyang a simple message: North Korea must abandon these dangerous programs and choose a better path for its people.”
The United Kingdom’s UN Ambassador Matthew Rycroft called the resolution a “step change,” which represented “an important moment for the Security Council.”
Whether the Security Council and UN member states can translate toughly worded measures into enforceable actions that make North Korea think twice before proceeding with its nuclear program is another matter.
William Newcomb, a former member of the United Nations Panel of Experts on North Korea, is quoted by Reuters as saying that the draft which finally was adopted as Resolution 2270 was “definitely worth the wait it took to plug loopholes and toughen restrictions on transport and finance." But he added a cautionary note: "Implementation remains a challenge, however. Not even all members of the Security Council have implemented past resolutions."
Some measures in the resolution can be more readily implemented and monitored than others.
For example, Resolution 2270 imposes new mandatory cargo inspection regime procedures to limit North Korea’s ability to transfer UN-prohibited items. The procedures include requiring states to inspect cargo to/from North Korea or brokered by North Korea that is within or transiting their territories. The resolution includes provisions intended to prevent North Korea from end-running inspection of its own vessels or aircraft though charter arrangements with other states. It bans flights of any plane suspected of carrying prohibited items.
Implementation of the mandatory cargo inspection regime will vary by member state. Such countries as the United States, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand and Western European countries will be able to monitor and intercept suspected cargo vessels if they deem necessary. The U.S. Navy has already taken such action back in 2011 with respect to a North Korean ship it suspected of carrying missile technology, and can be expected to do so again with the increased authority provided by Resolution 2270.
However, Iran will obviously not comply with the cargo or other provisions of this resolution, any more than it has complied with Security Council resolutions directed at Iran itself. One question is whether the U.S. would be willing to risk a military confrontation with Iran and North Korea acting together if vessels or aircraft with suspected cargo transiting between Iran and North Korea were to be intercepted.
The resolution imposes new financial sanctions targeting North Korean banks and assets. It prohibits member states’ financial institutions from opening new representative offices, branches, or banking accounts in North Korea, and requires them to shut existing ones down, if reasonable grounds exist to believe such financial services could contribute to North Korea’s nuclear or missile programs or UN Security Council violations. All public or private financial support for trade with North Korea, including export credits, guarantees, and insurance, are similarly prohibited where there is concern they could contribute to the same type of suspicious activities. These measures are readily implementable. However, the question remains whether North Korean officials or entities will still have the ability to launder money they receive through dummy accounts in foreign banks.
The resolution for the first time targets North Korea’s revenue sources. It does so by banning exports from North Korea of coal, iron, and iron ore, unless such transactions are determined to be exclusively for “livelihood purposes” and unrelated to generating revenue for North Korea’s nuclear/missile programs or other activities that constitute UN Security Council resolution violations. It also bans exports of gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare earth minerals. These export bans, while helpful, may not work so well in practice. Countries needing these natural resources are likely to buy first and ask questions later as to how the money North Korea receives will be spent. The “livelihood purposes” exemption opens up a huge potential loophole. Monitoring of North Korea’s disbursement of funds will be virtually impossible.
The resolution also bans transfers of aviation fuel, including rocket fuel, to North Korea. The bulk of such fuel in the past has reportedly come from China, which means that China will be primarily responsible for enforcing this ban through self-imposed trade restrictions.
The resolution clarifies a ban on technical cooperation with North Korea on launches using ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a satellite or space launch. Member states may by and large be willing to abide by this ban so long as dual use technology is not involved that a member state wanting to trade or collaborate with North Korea could plausibly argue is intended exclusively for non-nuclear related purposes. This is a problem for United Nations agencies themselves that have provided dual use technology to North Korea in the past. Just last month, it was reported by CNS News that the “head of a U.N. agency which gets a significant proportion of its budget from U.S. patent applicants transferred U.S.-origin computer equipment with dual-use potential to North Korea.”
In any event, Iran, which has also benefitted from such dual use equipment transfers from the UN, will certainly continue to cooperate fully with North Korea on missile and nuclear weapon technologies.
Finally, while its sponsors have made clear that the resolution is not intended to cause more suffering for the North Korean people, the resolution added a “catch-all” provision to ban the transfer of any item except food or medicine – even if not covered by the arms embargo – that could directly contribute to the operational capabilities of North Korea’s armed forces. This vague provision will be subject to multiple interpretations and difficult to enforce.
South Korea’s UN ambassador concluded the Security Council meeting with a plea to North Korea’s leaders to stop their nuclear weapons activities immediately. “Please wake up, open your eyes, give up the nukes and join the rest of the world,” he said.
While Resolution 2270 calls for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks and various members of the Security Council continue to hold the door open for negotiations with North Korea, there is little expectation that the megalomaniac Kim Jong-un will allow his country to “give up the nukes” and “join the rest of the world.”
Given North Korea’s track record, the Security Council reserved the right to take further significant measures in the event of continued North Korean nuclear tests or launches. However, short of military action, it is difficult to conceive of what further significant measures would be left for the Security Council to impose that would not be vetoed.
