- Roni Bart
President Obama’s June 4 speech in Cairo continued to illustrate his basic approach towards the international arena. In previous speeches, particularly those in Europe, Latin America, and Ankara, the president explicitly or implicitly apologized for past American mistakes, promised to listen and consult rather than issue edicts, and suggested exchanging disagreements and conflicts with cooperation to promote common goals, all of this on the basis of “mutual respect and interest.” Obama also is wont to list popular steps that the United States under his leadership has taken and will take. There is no doubt that his election to the presidency, his approach to international issues, and his rhetoric have measurably improved the international atmosphere surrounding the United States.
At the same time, a significant portion of the enthusiasm surrounding his speeches presumably stems from the fact that the president did not mention the mistakes of his hosts, and did not suggest – and certainly not demand – concrete steps on their part. Apparently Obama expects that providing inspiration and example will bear fruit. In the meantime, the balance is negative: Europe continues to refuse to reinforce the military presence in Afghanistan, Russia has not changed its conduct in Eastern Europe, there has been an escalation in North Korea, and Iran is hardly "reaching out." So far, the administration has succeeded in leading a “change” on issues where it has accepted another’s agenda (Russia and negotiations over nuclear disarmament, openness towards Cuba), or on issues where the United States is in effect operating without any partners (Iraq, Afghanistan-Pakistan).
The Cairo speech strove to encourage a new attitude in the Muslim-Arab world toward the United States, a high priority for Obama. The speech represents the climax of a consistent posture that emerged already in his inaugural speech, where “the Muslim world” was the only international entity mentioned and to which he proposed “a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect” (a formula repeated in Cairo). The speech in the Ankara parliament was of the same mind. Significantly, the first media interview granted by the president was to the al-Arabia network.
Indeed, the central message of the Cairo speech did not unveil new ideas. Obama spoke of replacing tension, suspicion, disagreements, and stereotypes with “a new beginning”; he hinted to the West's negative attitude to the Muslim-Arab world in the 20th century (colonialism, the Cold War); he noted the role played by Muslims in the United States; he repeated that the United States has no argument with Islam but only with extreme and violent minority groups (without using the term “terrorists,” which is not liked by Muslims); and he praised both Islam and the contributions of the Muslim world to civilization. This part of the speech, interspersed with verses from the Qur’an, was entirely politically correct and will no doubt convey a message of openness and a desire for greater closeness. Thus while there was nothing new in the speech (either relative to earlier remarks by Obama or to Bush), its importance lies in the circumstances of its delivery: an American president traveling far, making a diligent effort to woo the Muslim-Arab world. This is of great significance.
In the second part of the speech, President Obama referred to a number of political issues. Here too his speech introduced little about Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan, where he pledged to fight against violent organizations and help reconstruction efforts. Perhaps in contrast to common perception, only about 15 percent of the speech was devoted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and it broke no new ground, either in terms of the decisive statement about the settlements or in the “two states for two peoples” formula. Despite the location and the target audience of the speech, the president mentioned the “unbreakable bond” between the United States and Israel, the Holocaust and its deniers (though not Muslim-Arab anti-Semitism), and Israel’s right to security. On the other hand, the president used unprecedented formulations (jarring to the Israeli ear) regarding the plight of the Palestinians, drawing an implicit parallel between African slavery in the United States and apartheid in South Africa. Thus content-wise there was no justification for headlines in the vein of “An Historic Speech” or “A New Era.” Obama the candidate already expressed an adjusted balance in American terms with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As to the traditional pro-Israeli stance in Washington, the new president is now seen by some Israelis as pro-Palestinian/Arab; in fact the Cairo speech indicates a move only to the center, to the point of equilibrium, to the stance of “honest broker.” Israel must understand that in the eyes of a pragmatic administration free of emotional and/or intra-political bias, the Muslim-Arab world is more important than a Jewish state, and Israel is not just an asset but could also be a potential burden. The speech revealed nothing new in this sense, rather “merely” expressed it.
The part of the speech most significant in terms of content dealt with Iran and the nuclear challenge. First, referring to “many issues to discuss,” President Obama hinted that the direct dialogue expected to begin after the Iranian elections will touch on issues other than the nuclear question. In other words, the process will last longer, and that has ramifications for the ticking clock. Second, Obama expressed willingness “to move forward without preconditions.” This is more than just a hint that he is willing to concede the condition that Iran suspend its nuclear program in order to allow for negotiations. If this is indeed what he meant to say, this is a significant and dangerous development. Third, the president made no mention whatsoever of other options – sanctions or military options. Fourth, Obama recognized Iran’s right to civilian nuclear capabilities, and thus again implied acceptance of Iran as a “threshold state.” In contrast to Bush who sought to block Iran's uranium enrichment capability, it would seem that Obama is satisfied with preventing the development of nuclear arms. Finally, the president spoke of global nuclear disarmament and of “all the region’s nations” joining the nonproliferation treaty, two problematic hints from the perspective of Israel’s opacity policy. These points, as well as Obama’s not condemning Iran over the nuclear and other issues, create a very worrisome picture regarding softened American attitudes vis-à-vis Iran.
The third part of the speech, more than a quarter of it, dealt with democracy, religious freedom, women’s rights, and economic development. The president glorified these ideals, criticized delicately, and praised some negligible examples. He avoided calling explicitly on the Muslim-Arab world to embrace these values, either in theory or practice. This restraint is highly conspicuous, particularly when compared with the speech made four years ago in the same place by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Not only did she speak on the same subject with greater resolve; she also translated it into specific demands of the Cairo regime. Under the previous administration, American pressure about civil rights produced the release of the head of the Egyptian opposition from jail and cost Egypt $200 million in American aid. Obama’s speech makes it clear that this will not happen on his watch. Moreover, the president quoted the Qur’an’s injunction on speaking the truth, and a few days earlier had said of Israel that friends must be honest. Yet at the beginning of his speech, he rejected the claim that Islam is hostile to human rights, without mentioning that in practice such hostility does exist in Arab countries. Similarly, he refrained from even hinting at the Palestinians’ responsibility for the disasters that have befallen them. The two-facedness peaked when the president noted that he had instructed closing the Guantanamo prison, a popular move whose mention earned him much approval – at a time when the Arab world is strewn with far worse camps. The speech disappointed the few reformists in the Arab world, and promises a close alliance with authoritarian regimes interested in stability.
In conclusion, the speech in Cairo will be remembered as a milestone in the annals of “soft power” and public diplomacy based on persuasion, symbols, and the media. It likely contributed to a rise in America’s popularity on the Arab street. However, this rise will not affect Muslims in Afghanistan-Pakistan who are victimized as a result of the struggle against violent extremists, the Iraqis who are tired of America, and anyone who is expecting Obama to succeed in ridding Palestinian areas of an Israeli presence. Furthermore, the Arab street has proven time and again to have but limited effect on governments. In this sense, the speech should be measured by its success in persuading Arab nations to gradually normalize their relations with Israel (one of the few concrete calls in the speech). One may assume that this will not happen, certainly not before Israel freezes the settlements (a touchstone for the president). As a citizen of the world, one lauds the effort to trade the “culture clash” for a culture dialogue. As an Israeli, one has reason for concern.
