Once again Syria commands a leading position on the international agenda, due to the flood of refugees moving through Europe – as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey are no longer able to take in additional Syrian refugees – and due to President Vladimir Putin’s decision to substantially increase military aid to the Assad regime.
This new Russian assistance includes the construction of a Russian airfield on the Syrian coast near Latakia in the Alawite district, Assad’s primary base of support. Moscow’s heightened involvement in Syria cut short the preliminary discussions between the various external players who were trying to formulate a political settlement in which Assad himself would step down, even as the regime would continue to maintain its existing character during a transition period. This was predicated on the assessment that the Syrian army and security mechanisms were critical in stabilizing the situation during an interim period, as well as on the need to neutralize the involvement of the Islamic State and other Salafist jihadi forces whose capabilities were outstripping those of the other factions fighting in Syria.
The Islamic State as the Key Threat: Broad Agreement Is Insufficient
The foreign actors in the Syrian arena – the United States, Russia, the EU, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Gulf principalities, and Jordan, as well as the various minority groups in Syria (the Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and others – share a primary interest, namely, dismantling the Islamic State and preventing its takeover of Syria in the post-Assad era. This shared interest ostensibly serves as the basis for establishing a transitional government in Syria that would stabilize the situation and outline a path for the future. But it seems that promoting the interests shared by most of the actors as a way to formulate an interim agreement in Syria under regional and international sponsorship is beyond reach, which is why the respective actors are in no hurry to bring the phenomenon known as the Islamic State to an end.
The Western powers, led by the United States, are not willing to pay the price needed to dismantle the Islamic State’s military capabilities and to replace the Assad regime, i.e., putting boots on the ground – the only effective way to change the situation. Somewhat surprisingly, the confrontation with the Islamic State has yielded some positive consequences, such as channels of coordination and dialogue with Iran and other players not allied with the United States. Furthermore, at this point the United States and its allies are not eager to attack the Islamic State with the required effectiveness because the collapse of the Islamic State could result in increased power for Assad.
Iran, which sees the Islamic State as an immediate threat to its own hegemony in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond, is very concerned about the ramifications of a coalition fighting the Islamic State, especially the possibility of an extensive US military presence in the region – near the Iran-Iraq border, in the Kurdish enclave, and in eastern Turkey, as well as in Syria and Jordan. The Iranians view the strengthening of Assad’s regime as a primary tool in stopping the Islamic State from spreading and preventing the radical Sunni elements – especially Salafist jihadists, such as Jabhat al-Nusra – from seizing control of Syria.
Another key actor is Turkey, led by President Erdogan, which is using the Islamic State as a smokescreen to hide its destruction of bases of the PKK and the Kurdish underground in northern Iraq, northern Syria, and even within Turkey itself. Typical of his fickle opinions, Erdogan has removed the ouster of Assad from the top of the list of Turkey’s demands. As for fighting the Islamic State, Erdogan has made it clear that Turkey will take resolute action only after NATO, led by the United States, gathers the necessary forces toward that objective.
For Saudi Arabia and the Gulf principalities, Iran remains the most threatening enemy. Their policy is therefore aimed at reducing Iran’s influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Some of the Arab nations see a drawn out, pointless war against the Islamic State as the lesser of the evils compared to two worse possibilities for the future of Syria: Iranian dominance via its proxies, such as Hizbollah, or the seizure of power by factions belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafist jihadists, their main enemy within the Sunni camp itself. Therefore, the Islamic State offers them a way to deflect what they consider to be two graver alternatives – Iranian dominance or a radical Muslim government in Syria. The Middle East rationale mandates creating influence with the power to destroy rather than to contribute constructively. Therefore, in the short term and given to the need to choose sides right now, the so-called pragmatic Sunni states are assisting – or allowing provision of military and economic assistance – to Salafist jihadi organizations and the Muslim Brotherhood fighting against the Assad regime.
Looking Ahead
The Syrian tragedy reflects the fact that the Assad regime and the Islamic State are the flashpoints for two sets of conflicts in the Muslim Arab world: first, the inter-ethnic conflict between the Sunni camp, led by Saudi Arabia, and the Shiite camp, led by Iran, and second, the intra-Sunni rivalries, which are no less dramatic than the inter-ethnic fights, the latter involving the so-called pragmatic states, the Salafist jihadi actors, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Both the Assad regime and the Islamic State are tools in the hands of stronger actors; they enjoy immunity thanks to the lack of resolve among the various adversaries to topple them. The very existence of the Islamic State at its current level of power and the fear of a vacuum in Syria keep external involvement from destroying Assad’s regime.
The key question in behind the scenes discussions among the involved parties is: will Assad be forced to give up the presidency, or will he be part of the settlement for a transition period, after which the Syrian people will have a chance to determine the nature of the permanent arrangement? The Saudi-led Sunni camp has decided to join forces with Turkey and Qatar, the nations identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, and they refuse any option that includes Assad retaining his position even for an interim period. By contrast, Iran, which views Assad’s survival as a firm precondition, is supported by Russia, and the two are coordinating their moves to this end. Russia has once again hardened its line and is significantly increasing its military deployment and aid to Assad’s regime, even to the point of active military involvement. The Sunni camp, which considers the toppling of Assad as a central goal, has greatly strengthened the forces rebelling against the Assad regime in Syria’s north and south. Support for the rebel forces will continue to the point where Assad is severely compromised and he represents a burden rather than an asset for Iran and Russia. At that point, it will be possible to neutralize their veto power over an interim arrangement without Assad at the helm. In response, the increasing Russian military intervention and the close coordination between Russia and Iran are intended to create a situation in which an Alawite-minority regime remains in place in the coastal strip from the north, through Hama and Homs, to Damascus and the area bordering Lebanon.
Consequences for Israel
In practice, Syria is already split internally and divided into areas under the influence of external powers. As the Russians deploy, the coastal region will all but come directly under their control. Northern Syria, especially the Kurdish region, is under Turkish influence. The central axis of Syria – from Damascus to Homs and Aleppo – and the Syrian-Lebanese border are, with Hizbollah’s help, under Iranian influence. Eastern Syria is the battlefield for the war by the US-led international coalition against the Islamic State.
The only area not claimed by an outside force as a critical interest is the southern Syrian expanse, including the Golan Heights. It is critical that Israel retain operational freedom of action in this sector and in Lebanon. Israel was therefore shocked once it became clear that Russia was sending forces and building military strongholds on the Syrian coast. This was the reason Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, accompanied by IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot, rushed to Moscow: to formulate understandings on avoiding clashes between Russian and Israeli forces, especially aerial clashes, and preventing the arrival of advanced Russian weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles, that could impinge on the IDF’s operational freedom of action in Lebanon and southern Syria. Moreover, Israel is concerned that advanced weapons that Russia supplies to Assad’s forces will end up in Hizbollah hands, especially in Lebanon. Perhaps Israel was also testing the possibility of the Russian track being used in reaching understandings on rewriting the rules of the game with regard to the Iran-Assad-Hizbollah axis, based on the awareness of the shared threat inherent in the Islamic State.
Israel must thus undertake an in-depth analysis of the changing rules of the game, in face of the Russian involvement and Moscow’s determination to shape the future of Syria. This new situation changes the internal and external balance of power in Syria and increases the risk of events spilling over to Israel, such as the possibility that Salafist jihadi rebel forces will be drawn to southern Syria, the only Syrian sector currently free of active influence by external actors. The Israeli government must formulate its long term goals for the north, including willingness to fight for operational freedom of action, and the ability to establish an Israeli area of influence in southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and southern Syria.
