“The Whole Truth”? On Disclosure by the IAEA

- Ephraim Asculai and Emily B. Landau The (likely) penultimate report of outgoing IAEA director general ElBaradei on the nuclear situation in Iran was leaked to the press on Friday, August 28, 2009. The report contains information that Iran is pressing forward with its uranium enrichment activity, while steadily increasing its capacity to do so.

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With regard to evidence of "possible military dimensions" of its nuclear program, the report notes lack of progress in clarifying with Iran the outstanding questions regarding information on its development of the nuclear explosive mechanism and the accompanying warhead delivery systems. Contrary to expectations, the report contains no reference to what has recently been reported, that the IAEA is in possession of additional and more incriminating evidence against Iran that it has so far refused to make public. The technical facts included in the IAEA report and the ensuing predictions are clear: should Iran decide to produce the core for its first nuclear explosive device, it can do so already, by utilizing some of its enrichment capacity to enrich existing stocks of low enriched uranium (LEU) to high levels (HEU). In about six months it should have enough LEU for further enrichment for a second core.[1] This estimate is based on Iran's present operating capacity. However, Iran has almost doubled the number of installed gas centrifuge enrichment machines, without yet operating the additional machines. One speculation for adding machines without operating them is that Iran is refraining from carrying out provocative actions before the West assesses its behavior toward the end of September, along the same logic whereby after a year of resistance it suddenly permitted inspections in Arak (the heavy water reactor) and allowed increased inspections at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant. Should the additional centrifuges be put into operation, the rate of production of LEU will be increased accordingly. In addition, Iran is developing more advanced gas centrifuge machines, which will have an increased capacity if and when installed and running. With this technological achievement, the potential production of nuclear explosive cores remains a political decision. Should Iran decide to use the known stocks of LEU for this purpose, the good news is that it will become known to the inspectors within a short period of time. Unfortunately, however, in its present mode of operation the IAEA cannot be depended on to announce this to the world; more likely, it would begin its routine of asking Iran for explanations, trying to clarify intentions, waiting for answers and corroborating them with other sources, and so on. We see this bureaucratic foot dragging reflected in the report's discussion of the "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program, which includes the particularly naive complaint that "the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran are making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on this matter." Why would any country agree to share sensitive intelligence information with Iran, and put its sources at risk? This attitude is reflected also in the IAEA report on Syria, which was published the same day. The IAEA received no cooperation from Syria on the matter of the bombed reactor site at Dair Alzour, which led the Director General to "call on other States, including Israel, which may possess information which may have led them to conclude that the installation in question had been a nuclear reactor, to make such information available to the Agency." Surely the IAEA has all the information it needs to arrive at the conclusion that the bombed installation was indeed a nuclear reactor under construction. The recent allegations concerning the IAEA's withholding of evidence on Iran's developing a military nuclear program cast the IAEA in an unfavorable light. The explanation for this is not clear, but media reports concur that the person arguing for caution and secrecy with regard to Iran is the Director General himself. That important information might possibly be intentionally omitted from the IAEA periodic reports by ElBaradei is appalling. The case against Iran hinges on such information, which is essential for confronting Iran with the full weight of a determined and coordinated international response. Evidence of disagreements within the IAEA itself over the question of disclosure of information regarding Iran first surfaced 18 months ago, when on February 25, 2008, IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Olli Heinonen, elaborated on the public IAEA report that was published three days earlier. In a closed-door meeting that was quickly leaked to the press, Heinonen presented to the 35-nation IAEA board new details about Iran's nuclear program: research into key technologies needed to build and to deliver a nuclear bomb. At the time, Heinonen was quoted as saying that some of the research carried out by Iran was not consistent with any other application than the development of a nuclear weapon. In an attempt to minimize the significance of the information Heinonen presented, ElBaradei, in his report to the Board of Governors on March 3, said that Iran had clarified most of the outstanding questions except for the alleged studies regarding possible weaponization activities. Still, enough concern was raised by Heinonen's evidence to facilitate agreement on a third set of sanctions in the UN Security Council in March 2008, albeit not very strong ones. Most likely, internal differences of opinion within the IAEA over disclosure continue with regard to the current material on Iran. Yet with so much dependent on this kind of information and the conclusions that can be drawn as to Iran's nuclear weapons development, the international community cannot afford to allow the IAEA to have any other agenda than a technical one. If there is incriminating evidence, it must be disclosed – period. [1] For a complete analysis: