Smuggled guns
The Report's estimation of smuggled firearms is unconvincing [pp 16-21].
Just 783 guns were submitted for tracing out of 1,140 crime guns. Admittedly, there was no need to submit the 8% (97) of recovered crime guns that had a link to the Canadian registry. And those deemed Incomplete (139) were unable to be traced. Still, the sources for many guns are unknown, so it is possible some had been smuggled. What happened to the 121 other 'Negative' guns?
Of the 783 trace requests, just 229 were successful. 50% were domestic, and 48% were 'deemed smuggled'? The report is silent on how was this was determined. The report says, "When a trace request is submitted for long guns a negative result is typically an indication that the firearm originated in Canada."
Domestic sources
This is a very vague category and includes:
- firearms owned by holders of PAL or POL, whether unrestricted (and therefore not registered) or restricted or prohibited and registered,
- firearms illegally possessed, whether handguns or long guns,
- stolen firearms--whether from a PAL or POL holder or not, firearms lost or stolen from the police or military.
It is important to note that the police--neither the TPS nor the RCMP--provide any information about how many "crime guns" originated from the Canadian police or military. The police might understandably be hesitant to report such figures, but internationally a significant percentage of "crime guns" has been found to originate from local police and military stock. Unfortunately, Canadian government records are incomplete because Canadian police and military are not required to report regularly to Parliament how many firearms they lose or have stolen from them. Nevertheless, ATIP requests reveal partial figures, such as, in 2002 the Canadian military reported over 400 guns were lost or stolen.
4.
More recently, the RCMP admitted in 2016, again in response to a request under the Access to Information Act by Dennis Young, that 108 firearms were lost, missing or stolen from the RCMP.
5
In conclusion
The FIESD definitions are being used to justify policies that are destructive of the law-abiding Canadian firearms community. It is doubtful that the misleading definitions used in this report were inadvertently invented by low-ranking statisticians in the FIESD (Firearms Investigative and Enforcement Services Directorate) or NWEST. These definitions must have been created by higher ranking officers who crafted them to achieve their strategic goals. As yet, we have no documented sources that indicate who determined this definition nor why they did so.
The Liberal government promises "evidence based" policy, but to do so it is necessary to have honest methods for collecting and assessing the facts. Opening these police reports to public scrutiny allows their research methods to be criticized. Such oversight can only improve their quality, and eventually, one hopes, will result in solid policy decisions. This report reeks of efforts to concoct findings that will support policy that has previously been agreed upon. Canadians deserve "evidence based" policy, not policies based on fabricated data.
Footnotes:
- Philip J. Cook, Wendy Cukier and Keith Krause. The illicit firearms trade in North America. Criminology and Criminal Justice. (pdf attached).
- Hemskirk, Tony and Eric Davies. A report on illegal movement of firearms in British Columbia. PSSG-09-003. 2009
- Minutes of the public meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board held on January 22, 2004. #P8.
- The Solicitor General of Canada was reported in Hansard as saying in Parliament on January 27, 2002 that the RCMP is not required to report to CISC or to Parliament how many firearms have been lost or stolen from either evidence lockers or issued to detachments. In 2002, the RCMP reported that CPIC listed 409 firearms lost by the Department of Defence.
- Of the 108 guns stolen, lost or missing, the RCMP reported on September 3, 2003 that these included 55 handguns and 41 rifles or shotguns, and 29 other weapons such as Tasers. (See attached RCMP ATIP 2016 response pdf)