Remember when it was the official policy of the United States that Iran would not, under any circumstances, be allowed to become a nuclear power? That has now been replaced by a new policy, which says: Barack Obama will agree to pretty much anything if it means he can announce legacy-defining agreements.
And in recent testimony before Congress, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained exactly what that means not only for the Middle East but in the broader context of global nuclear proliferation. The Wall Street Journal explains:
Here's how he described the talks in his prepared remarks:
"Nuclear talks with Iran began as an international effort, buttressed by six U.N. resolutions, to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option. They are now an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability through an agreement that sets a hypothetical limit of one year on an assumed breakout. The impact of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it." (The italics are Mr. Kissinger's.)
Mull that one over. Mr. Kissinger always speaks with care not to undermine a U.S. Administration, and the same is true here. But he is clearly worried about how far the U.S. has moved from its original negotiating position that Iran cannot enrich uranium or maintain thousands of centrifuges. And he is concerned that these concessions will lead the world to perceive that such a deal would put Iran on the cusp of being a nuclear power.
Administration leaks to the media have made clear that Secretary of State John Kerry 's current negotiating position is that Iran should have a breakout period of no less than a year. But as Mr. Kissinger told the Senators in response to questions, that means verification and inspections become crucial. "In the space of one year, that will create huge inspection problems, but I'll reserve my comment on that until I see the agreement," Mr. Kissinger said.
"But I would also emphasize the issue of proliferation. Assuming one accepts the inspection as valid" and "takes account of the stockpile of nuclear material that already exists, the question then is what do the other countries in the region do? And if the other countries in the region conclude that America has approved the development of an enrichment capability within one year of a nuclear weapon, and if they then insist on building the same capability, we will live in a proliferated world in which everybody--even if that agreement is maintained--will be very close to the trigger point."
So Obama and Kerry have abandoned the idea that nuclear capabilities should be limited only to certain nations, and are instead putting their faith in international inspection regimes to ensure that potential rogue regimes like the one in Iran respect the limits imposed by the international community on their nuclear capabilities.
This invites a new round of evasions, obfuscations and toothless demands as untrustworthy regimes inevitably seek to get around the limits and other nations scurry for a way to enforce what really can't be enforced.
Obama's mistake on Iran stems from the same conceit that drove his Cuba fiasco. Way back during the 2008 primary campaign, Obama ripped the Bush Administration for refusing to talk to Iran until the Iranians met certain conditions. The thinking of the Bush White House (and really of every other administration before this one) is that getting to deal directly with the United States was a privilege, tyrannical nations like Iran and Cuba had to earn it by making certain concessions upfront in the realm of human rights.
Obama scoffed at that notion, saying in a Democrat primary debate: "The idea that, by not talking to these countries, we are somehow them is ridiculous."
And with that one statement, Obama told us a lot about how he would approach foreign policy. He clearly does not believe in the prestige or the moral authority of the United States, and has been all too willing to pursue negotiations with global bad actors who can't believe their luck to be sitting across the table with an American administration so eager to make just about any sort of deal.
This foolishness now has us sitting at the table while Cuba makes demands about Guantanamo and reparations, lest they get up and walk away. And it has us so desperate for a deal with Iran that we've given up on the idea that the Iranians cannot have the bomb. They're going to have it now, and we're just quibbling over the details.
This is the price you pay, America, when you elect a president who doesn't believe in America's leadership role and refuses to exercise that leadership on the global stage. Once Iran has the bomb, why should any other nation refrain from pursuing it? We're proving here that we will do nothing to stop anyone from getting it.
Remember when there were only five or six nuclear powers and the fear was always that some unstable, rogue regime would get a hold of one? That defined the fear of nuclear proliferation. Now, thanks to the thinking of Barack Obama and John Kerry, the question is whether there will be anyone left who doesn't have the bomb.
