"This article explains why US ground forces are not just a better option than the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces], but absolutely necessary for achieving US policy objectives against the Islamic State," argues David Johnson (US Army, Ret.) -- a senior historian at the RAND Corporation -- in a special commentary article from the current issue of US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters.
According to Johnson, the current American "means" available to the United States for dealing with the Islamic State are restricted to advisers, U.S. support to the Iraqis, and air power options. But problems arise from these limited approaches, as well as from the alternatives to U.S. "boots on the ground" -- including the ISF, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Sunni and Shi'a militias. Most notably, the Shi'a militias are supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
As Johnson notes, "Major General Qasem Soleimaini, commander of the Iranian Quds Force, was at one point directing the offensive to retake Tikrit." Clearly, having Iranian Quds Force commanders directing U.S. supported actions against the Islamic State raises a host of strategic problems for American foreign policy in the region, in addition to the sectarian tensions that inevitably arise when Iran is working in Sunni-dominated locales.
The report in
Parameters goes on to analogize the current capacity of Islamic State fighters to hide within the natural landscape and cities to what the U.S. military faced with the North Vietnamese Army and how Hamas operates in Gaza, rather than to the types of insurgencies the Americans fought in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Attempting to retake Sunni-dominated urban areas using Shi'a militias, Peshmerga, and/or ISF forces results in further drawbacks. The Sunni populations do not trust any of these options, leading them to continue supporting the Islamic State. At another level, these forces working against the Islamic State also don't trust each other. By comparison, US ground forces might be viewed as "honest brokers," says Johnson.
While the challenges mount, our time is short. Johnson's position is that "[i]f the ISF fails, the Islamic State will receive a boost in prestige and recruiting appeal, thus increasing its threat to the region, US friends and allies, and possibly even the homeland."
In Johnson's words, it is time for strategic clarity.
