The warning stories exclude the context of what was behind all of these Egyptian visits
But The Atlantic leaves out the fact that this was hardly the first such visit.
For example, Kamel had visited Israel in 2018 to address the Gaza border clashes and push his government’s plan for Israeli concessions in exchange for reduced violence by Hamas. Another such visit was planned but canceled later that year. Kamel visited Israel twice in 2021 to discuss violence at the time and the return of the Israeli hostages then being held in Gaza.
He canceled a planned visit in 2022 and an Israeli figure instead met him in Egypt.
Kamel’s visit wasn’t the shocking change of pace that media stories portray it as, but the latest in a series of visits to discuss Gaza that had been going on for years. The media doesn’t actually deny that, but it uses narrative tricks to make the 2023 trips by Kamel seem startling.
The Atlantic opens its narrative with language worthy of a suspense thriller. “a chartered Cessna jet linked to Egypt’s intelligence service had touched down at Ben Gurion Airport, about 30 miles away. The jet rolled to a stop in an isolated section of the airport used for sensitive diplomatic and security missions. Abbas Kamel, Egypt’s intelligence chief and one of the region’s most influential security officials, had come to Israel on a most sensitive mission.”
(The magazine’s past editors might have flagged the use of “sensitive” in two sentences in a row, but the current ones don’t seem to have a copy of a good thesaurus.)
Reading that, you wouldn’t think that Kamel had been routinely making these visits for years.
Media stories play up the refusal by Israel to confirm Kamel’s visit, but considering Israel’s complicated relationship with Egypt, which is still an enemy, these are routinely kept secret.
The warning stories exclude the context of what was behind all of these Egyptian visits.
In 2018 and 2019, Hamas staged border protests to test Israel’s security. These border clashes were misrepresented as civilian protests against Israel. An Egyptian delegation met with Hamas and Israeli government officials to negotiate Israeli concessions in exchange for an end to the riots. The riots resumed in 2021-2022 along with military clashes and the Egyptian negotiations.
In September 2023, border clashes seriously picked up in part to pressure Israel into allowing sizable infusions of cash from Qatar into Gaza, and the Egyptians once again got involved. The Egyptians began pressuring Israel to make concessions to Hamas in order to avoid a conflict.
The Egyptians would later tell the media and members of Congress that they had ‘warned’ Israel, but what they were actually doing was warning Israel to make concessions or there would be more clashes: they were certainly not warning about an Oct 7 level invasion.