Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid
The defense industries are one of the cornerstones of Israel’s security. They were born of an understanding that Israel could not rely on external sources for procurement of needed materials and systems. Local production goes hand in hand with research and development in Israel, enabling the tailoring of unique weapons systems to the IDF’s changing needs, giving it advantages on the battlefield.
The IDF is widely seen as the defense industries’ central customer, and its use of the industries’ products enhances their reputation when exporting their products to countries around the world.

The targeted killing by the United States in early 2020 of Qasem Soleimani, Commander of the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, was a severe blow to Iran’s ability to score further achievements in its campaign to export the Islamic Revolution and expand its influence throughout the Middle East. Soleimani saw himself as the defender of the Revolution’s values and the rule of the ayatollahs, worked in their name while not hesitating to make independent decisions, and formed close personal ties with leaders, commanders, and other influential figures in the region. Soleimani was able to understand the weaknesses of the regional system, and developed his own creative approach to utilize Iran’s strengths and expand its regional influence, mainly by means of proxy forces. For two decades he was the strategic architect of Iran’s expansion in the Middle East, and his loss leaves Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had groomed Soleimani, without a replacement of similar stature.
The timing of President Donald Trump’s invitation to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and to Chairman of the Blue and White alliance and Knesset opposition leader Benny Gantz to meet with him in Washington as part of the launch of the “deal of the century” was driven by the current political circumstances in both Israel and the United States. Beyond the political considerations, however, at issue is a key item on Israel’s national security agenda: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For this reason, it is important to analyze the plan’s potential significance, assess its implications for the political process and its prospects for advancing a resolution to the conflict, and consider the following steps, once the details of the “deal of the century” are made public.
On February 21, 2020, Iran’s citizens will go to the polls for parliamentary elections. The Majlis wields no substantive influence in determining Iranian strategy, especially in foreign affairs.
The September 14, 2019 attack on the oil facilities in Saudi Arabia – including Abqaiq, which is considered the largest of its kind in the world - is the most serious kinetic attack on oil facilities in the Gulf since the 1991 Gulf War, in terms of damage and economic significance. The attack resulted in a temporary reduction of 5.7 million barrels per day, about 50 percent of Saudi production capacity (total Saudi production capacity in August was 9.85 million barrels of oil per day, which are about 5 percent of global output). So far, the Saudis have maintained a partial blackout on the full details of the incident, and have so far avoided ascribing direct responsibility to Iran - in contrast to their initial responses following attacks in May and July on oil tankers in the Gulf and oil facilities in the kingdom that were attributed to Iran. Meantime, Riyadh is trying to broadcast “business as usual,” while emphasizing that there were no casualties and that they have the ability to return rapidly to oil production levels. Yet even if the Saudis do manage to resume full production quickly, the vulnerability of the oil supply chain to specific threats in the Gulf has been revealed.
As expected, the renewal of economic sanctions against Iran one year ago led to a worsening of an already bad economic situation in Iran. A number of economic indexes attest to the severity of the economic crisis, mainly the budget deficit stemming from the unprecedented drop in the export of Iranian oil, high inflation, and negative economic growth. In contrast, a number of indexes may also suggest that the Iranian economy is gradually acclimating to the sanctions regime.
There are growing signs that Israel has expanded its campaign against Iran’s efforts to consolidate its power in the region, including in attacks on infrastructures in Iraq that are linked to Iran. An overall cost-benefit analysis should prompt Israel to consider the potential implications of expanding the campaign, among them an early withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and Syria, which would leave Israel alone in the campaign against Iran’s entrenchment in the region.
Among the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean - a region with a long history of rivalries and disputes - there is a growing understanding that the window of opportunity to use natural gas to improve their economic situation significantly may close due to strong competition from other regions that are more stable politically and have larger quantities of natural gas. The growing economic wisdom in the eastern Mediterranean basin will not solve the various disputes between the countries of the region, but it may reduce the chances of those conflicts erupting.
In today’s complex and fluid reality, what are Israel’s war goals? An objective military victory along the lines of the Six Day War seems impossible. A subjective victory, by way of a “victory image,” is a matter for PR and propaganda aimed at public opinion. A “victory image,” being a Clausewitzian objective of a “political gain,” is not a legitimate goal for a democracy defending itself.
Over the past year, the Islamic Jihad organization has intensified its independent military actions from the Gaza Strip against Israel. Provocations included rocket fire toward Israeli communities, including toward central Israel, and sniper shots at IDF soldiers along the Gazan border. The organization’s involvement in directing activity during the violent civilian incidents along the Israel-Gaza security barrier is also evident. Clearly the organization has adopted a bolder and more independent approach toward Israel, and unlike in the past, its activities are not fully coordinated with Hamas and at times are even undertaken contrary to Hamas’s position.
The civilian front can expect to be challenged significantly in any future conflict with Hamas, and even more so, Hezbollah. The recent events deep within Israeli territory highlight the broad inherent risk of a systemic disruption due to rocket attacks on the civilian domain during a broad and protracted conflict, with a danger of multiple, simultaneous events that stretch the capacity of response systems. Israel was wise to come up with its overall concept for a national response to this complex challenge, interweaving military and offensive and defensive options with civilian response mechanisms.
Turkey’s insistence to move ahead with the S-400 deal with Russia, in spite of the American threat that this move would be met with sanctions, is expected to create a rift in relations between Turkey and the United States and the other allies in NATO. Reactions to this move by the administration and Congress are likely to be strong.
At his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 25, 2019, President Donald Trump signed a presidential proclamation recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This occurred more than 37 years after the Knesset ratified a bill in December 1981 extending Israeli jurisdiction over the Golan Heights, a measure that notwithstanding the denials by then-Prime Minister Menahem Begin was tantamount to annexation of the Golan Heights to Israel.
March 2019 marks the fortieth anniversary of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. This signed agreement affirmed peace as the strategic choice of both countries, and in turn distanced them from the danger of war. Over the years, the peace has survived challenges and upheavals, and provided tightened security cooperation around shared interests. However, relations between leaderships and security establishment are not enough, and the time has come to deepen the roots of peace between the two peoples. Reinforcing the civilian layer of the peace will benefit all parties: Israel will gain a closer bilateral axis with Egypt and deeper regional cooperation; and Egypt will reap the economic and technological fruits of cooperation with Israel. Although emotional and political barriers still exist on both sides, particularly in Egypt, there are signs of greater openness among the Egyptian public to relationships with Israel.
The public debate about the readiness of the ground forces for war intensified following the report issued in September 2018 by Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick before concluding his term as IDF ombudsman in January 2019. This classified report followed the ombudsman’s report issued in mid-2018.
In recent months, the parliaments in Ireland and in Chile took unprecedented measures that place severe limitations on economic trade with the settlements in the West Bank. Although at this stage these decisions are not binding and their direct impact is limited, their acceptance reflects the illegitimacy many international actors attribute to the settlements and their willingness to take concrete action against them.

