KBR Bans Cell Phones in Entire Middle East and Central Asia

By Sean Osborne —— Bio and Archives August 3, 2008

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04 AUG 2008: A clarification was issued by KBR management late yesterday afternoon regarding the ban on personal cell phone use by its OCONUS deployed employees. The clarification states "... the direction from [redacted] to all [KBR] employees in the Middle East and Central Asia is that you not use your personal cell phone. You can remove the battery and store it." Yesterday CNN reported that the Houston-based U.S. defense contractor KBR Inc. (formerly Kellogg Brown and Root) banned its employees in Iraq from using their private cell phones. In its report CNN appears to make the assumption that the cell phone ban was the result of a "security breach" involving one of KBR's employees. That kind of a security breach is more commonly known as a breach of Operation Security (OPSEC) guidelines.

However, CNN's assumption is completely erroneous. While the ban is a uniquely KBR initiative, the cause of the ban has been known the Northeast Intelligence Network since early Saturday morning and efforts to corroborate the KBR rationale have been successful. KBR banned cell phones in Iraq specifically due to a perceived significant threat to its personnel and facilities based on Iraqi Forward Operations Bases (FOBs). A KBR communication stated the following in the direct to all employees:

"Earlier today I sent out a message prohibiting the use of cell phones. At that time I was not able to share with you the reason. I can now. Cell phone technology has come a long way in recent years. The ability to track a cell phone using GPS and triangulation provides a capability to locate a cell phone within meters of a point. This morning IDF [Indirect Fire] rounds hit one of the sites where we live and work. There was a fatality. A review of the scene later revealed that a cell phone was used immediately prior to and after the attack – an outgoing call and two incoming calls. The phone was found within meters of the impact area."

Clearly the KBR management believes that insurgents have attained a capability to target American personnel, military or civilian contractors, in Iraq via GPS and or other triangulation methods. While there does not exist absolute proof of what KBR management suspects about GPS and triangulation of cell phone transmissions, it is a clear assessment that Iranian-supplied technical know-how or equipment is implied. In the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel it was Iranian-supplied high technology equipment that was captured intact by the Israel Defense Forces in southern Lebanon. The Northeast Intelligence Network acquired IDF photographic proof of one such Hezbollah command and control (C2) center. This proof was published on our website and was subsequently cited by DefenseTech.Org in a 1 DEC 2006 report. In that report the DefenseTech writer pointed out that the prestigious Aviation Week published the following information at that time:

"Hezbollah is incapable of penetrating and exploiting the Israeli army's tactical radio systems as it claimed it did during the recent fighting in Lebanon, say senior U.S. electronics industry officials. Even so, the militant Islamic organization is parlaying the results of a relatively common signals intelligence capability for analyzing communications traffic and intercepting cell-phone calls into a major psychological warfare victory, say U.S. officials. The success has been so complete that both Israel Defense Force (IDF) and U.S. Army users of advanced encrypted, frequency-hopping radios have raised doubts about the security of their communications. "What they're really doing is a very good psychological operation," says a senior information operations specialist and industry executive. "One of the things you want to do is instill doubt. Hezbollah makes the pronouncement that they can read encrypted radios. They wanted the IDF troops to believe they weren't as invulnerable as they thought... They scored big time. "What was more relevant was monitoring cell phones," [a] signals intelligence specialist tells the magazine, echoing what we said here when the Newsday story broke. "Everybody out there has a cell phone. You see any picture of troops on the street in Baghdad and they've got a Blackberry or a cell phone. That's what is monitored... With something like a police radio scanner, if you're in the right frequency, you can listen to a cell phone.""

And that my friends bring us forward from Lebanon in 2006 to Iraq in August 2008. There is no doubt that Hezbollah is operating as an Iranian proxy in Iraq. Call them 'Special Groups' or Qods Force, or whetever, they are in Iraq and they bring with then the best tech Iran can provide for the same psychological warfare purposes, but this time against American personnel. In additional research I discovered that The GSM 900 SIM phones used by our guys in central Iraq (where the reported mortar attack occurred) are on the Zain Iraq cell network. That network has been defended (the towers and the power supplies) by the Al-Ihsan Security Company. Those guards are current or former Shi'ite Badr Militiamen, and Al-Ihsan Security is owned by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (SCIRI/SIIC) who has very long-term and deep ties to Tehran. Is it a possibility that the Zain Iraq network has been compromised? I believe it is possible, I cannot prove it, but I believe it is a possibility and maintain that the absence of evidence is not an evidence of absence. Since Hezbollah and Iran are involed in Iraq, it is highly probable they brought along all of their newest 'toys' with them. Like their EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators) and IRAMs (Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions), they are all about the business of killing American, Iraqi and Coalition soldiers and civilians with them. Given what Iran has done in Iraq in killing American soldiers with their EFP and IRAM weapons, what have they to fear from killing civilian contractors by targeting them via cell phone triangulation? The US military in Iraq has yet to target any Iranian-soil target in retaliation. As a former SIGINT/ELINT type, I implicitly understand the KBR directive. It was not a decision taken lightly. It was one-hundred percent concerned with an effort focused on the safety and security of both military and civilian personnel. The KBR directive maintains possession of the phone with their owners but warns that non-compliance will result in confiscation of the device and its return when only when the owner departs for R&R, demobilization or transfer. Only those cell phones deemed essential to KBR operations are permitted under this ban, with the goal to also eliminate any that are not essential. Updates to this subject will be published as received.