Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe endorsed the agreement, noting that canola employs more than 200,000 Canadians and represents a $44-billion industry.
Those gains should be acknowledged rather than dismissed. Selling more Canadian canola, seafood, energy or minerals abroad can reduce exposure to American protectionism. That is diversification.
Strategic dependency is something else.
That distinction is clearest in automobiles. Ottawa will permit up to 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles annually at the 6.1-per-cent most-favoured-nation tariff. The federal government says that represents less than three per cent of Canada’s new-vehicle market and expects the arrangement may encourage joint-venture investment in Canadian manufacturing. Lower-cost vehicles and new factories could benefit Canadians.
But Washington will ask a different question. Will a vehicle built in Canada remain dependent on Chinese subsidies, batteries, software, data systems, components or strategic direction? If so, Washington may see Canada as an indirect route for Chinese interests into the American market.
Simply incorporating a company in Canada will not answer that concern. Nor will invoking sovereignty help if it ignores how deeply Canadian manufacturing, defence, intelligence, and infrastructure are integrated with the U.S.
Washington’s concerns extend beyond ownership and supply chains. In June, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative concluded that Canada had failed to effectively enforce its prohibition on forced-labour imports.
On July 23, USTR imposed a 10-per-cent duty on Canada under Section 301, a U.S. trade-law mechanism used to respond to foreign practices that burden American commerce.
The larger message is clear. When Washington believes gaps in Canadian enforcement threaten its interests, it is prepared to impose trade penalties.