A Russian Coup?

Tsar Vlad Divides and Conquers His Own Staff

The Army’s mini-mobilization overcame resistance from Putin, who was further marginalized by the Defense Ministry’s assuming direct control over all new recruits. The Navy’s sunken treasure was its fleeting mention that all naval, air, and air defense forces shall soon join the “yet-to-be formed Leningrad Military District.”

Russian presidential twilight falls between election (March 15) and inauguration (May 7).

Come the Ides of March will coup-plotters Gerasimov-Shoigu-Yemenov command enough troops to overwhelm Putin’s Siloviki?

Putin’s longevity rests upon disjointed governance structures tyrannized by fratricidal “force ministers” (Siloviki).

According to Princeton premier Putinologist, Timothy Frye:

“Putin oversees a range of security agencies that have mixed motives … they have overlapping agendas, and compete with each other for access to state funds, influence with the Kremlin, and opportunities to shake down private business. The competition between agencies helps to prevent the emergence of a single rival to Putin… the big guns do not speak with one voice, and have no leader apart from Putin…”

Putin’s divide-and-conquer survival strategy hobbles Russia’s war-drive.

If, as per normal, Russia’s war-effort centered around the Ministry of Defense (MOD), then MOD brass would acquire regime change capability. To prevent this Putin fights his “Special Military Op” on the cheap and sly – relying less on MOD and more on his carnival of: police/intel agencies, militias, warlord armies, motorcycle gangs, and mercenaries.

Critics of Putin’s crazy-quilt campaign usually demand Total War (a.k.a. Popular Mobilization) i.e., sending millions of soldiers over Ukraine’s undefended 1,800-km northern border.

Previously, when Putin ladled out new blood for his Special Op the largest dollops landed upon his Federal Security Service (FSB) and National Guard.

Best known for counterintelligence, surveillance, and internal security, FSB’s counter-terrorism and border-guard duties necessitate modern combat battalions. FSB budgets are secret. FSB probably employs 200,000.

Here’s Frye on Putin’s National Guard:

“Created in 2016 for the specific purpose of putting down mass revolts within Russia, the National Guard has around three hundred thousand troops at its disposal and reports directly to the president. Some have argued that this praetorian guard was created not only to put down popular revolts but also to discipline potentially disloyal elites.”

The only Commander the Guard has known, Viktor Zolotov, has been a Putin confidante for 33 years. He’s also been an institutionalizable anger-management case and an aggressive shot-caller inside St. Petersburg Murder Inc. …for 33 years.

The Interior Ministry’s 1 million officers may well be the world’s most corrupt, predatory and useless police force. They possess negligible military capacity. The Procuracy oversees major criminal investigations and internal government legal compliance. The Investigative Committee’s (IC) 20,000 employees mainly extort businesses. Neither Procuracy, nor IC, command soldiery.

Officially Putin runs all this, however according to Frye:

“The security services report to the president, but the Kremlin cannot monitor all the activities of these sprawling agencies, let alone easily direct them… with this level of ambiguity, security officials have great leeway to pursue their own interests even when they may conflict with those in the Kremlin.”

The omnipotent Security Council (SC) consists of: Putin, several Siloviki, Foreign Minister Lavrov, PM Mishustin, two parliamentarians, and SC Secretary Nikolai Patrushev – a 35-year Putin crony. Patrushev has been Secretary for 16 years. When Putin left the FSB Directorship in 1999 he handpicked Patrushev to take-over the FSB. When Patrushev moved up to Secretary he picked Alexander Bortnikov as the new FSB Director. Bortnikov still has the job.

Putin doesn’t dominate SC meetings. He controls neither admission nor attendance. As well, Putin’s decrees often go unenforced. Still, Putin disburses railcars of cash. He’s prioritizing his Special Op …as managed by Zolotov, Bortnikov, Patrushev, Kadyrov, Zhoga, Trushev et al.

Russia’s two rival armies undertake parallel army-building processes. During 2023 the MOD and Putin’s cronies each recruited hundreds of thousands. (While both groups incorporate “signing-up” into the enlistment process, Putin’s priggish adherence to contractual formality betrays fantasies of an all-mercenary, bounty-hunting privateer army.)

While MOD’s December pronouncements demonstrated initiative and pluck, Admiral Yemenov’s shot across Putin’s bow went further. Not only did the Admiral announce his intention to micro-manage 160,000 rifle-toting sailors; …he conjured Leningrad Military District’s ghost.

Leningrad’s Ghost

Militaries divide territories into manageable “Districts.”

Districts are both areas of land and collections of regionally-based fleets and brigades.

Tsar Alexander II founded St. Petersburg Military District in 1864.

Bolsheviks renamed it Leningrad Military District (LMD) in 1924.

LMD covered the Baltic and West Arctic coastlines. LMD survived WWII and 20 years of Yeltsin-Putin. In 2010 Putin dismembered LMD. Key components (Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet etc) merged with the Moscow Military District to form a new Moscow-HQed “Western Military District.”

Defense Minister Shoigu recently initiated LMD’s re-constitution. Putin, evincing a pattern of belatedly embracing Shoigu initiatives, apparently okayed LMD’s renewal. Later reportage, however, stressed that only a “draft presidential decree” validates LMD, while other sources describe LMD as “expanding.”

Is LMD a vortex of military men signaling their anti-Putinism?

Is LMD holding confidential meetings?

Is LMD coup-central?

Zelensky’s and Zaluzhnyy’s NATO-induzed denializm

Northern hordes maraud Zelensky’s fever-dreams. Zel recently slipped Freudianly whilst pitching his Bakhmut-to-Poland border wall. When listing the Oblasts his wall will defend, he neglected only Zhytomyr, the obvious invasion corridor. Facing north, Zelensky winces blind.

Zaluzhnyy’s well-read manifesto also arose from blind-eye reconnaissance. Zaluzhnyy claims Russia possesses only three times Ukraine’s human resources. While accurately diagnosing Putin’s mobilization-phobia, Zaluzhnyy fraudulently misdescribes Ukraine’s recruitment disadvantage.

The Government of Ukraine’s official, 43-million, population guestimate includes areas of “Ukraine” under Russian control. So, subtract several million. Subtract another several million for those who fled Ukraine (including a million draft-age males – and an equal number of 14-to-17-year-olds).

Ukraine’s real population is 28 million. Greater Russia’s population is 160 million. Potential recruitment disparity is even greater because Ukraine has suffered more casualties.

At the war’s outset (February 2022) Ukraine had 200,000 active soldiers and 900,000 reserves. Ukraine has since trained another 200,000; however, during this period:

• 400,000 Ukrainian soldiers were killed/disabled.
• Thousands of mercenaries fled.
• Thousands of reservists didn’t renew.
• Thousands of soldiers went overseas for training.
• Domestic training camps suffered mass-casualty airstrikes.
• Civilians organized a large, savvy anti-draft Resistance.

Presently, 300,000 Ukrainian soldiers adorn the Line of Contact. Another 250,000 supply the frontline with replacements, ammunition, fuel, food, medivac, intel and command-and-control. Farther back, 350,000 personnel perform various functions, including apprehending and supervising recruits.

Ukraine is in Total War mode. Ukraine cannot yield another million troops. Russia could deploy 8 million.

Zaluzhnyy denies Ukraine’s numerical nemesis because it exposes the war’s absurdity. If this were a serious war, it wouldn’t exist. If Russia mobilized at Ukraine’s rate, millions of Russian soldiers would trample Ukraine’s borders. Ukraine eludes annihilation by grace of Putin’s venality.

Rules of Engagement

NATO fears Ukrainian attacks on Russian soil will spawn insuppressible demands, within Russia, for a Popular Mobilization which will in time overthrow Putin. To keep Putin in office NATO opposes Ukrainian attacks on Russian soil.

International law allows invaded countries to counter-attack onto their invader’s homeland. Ukraine could grab swaths of south-western Russia. NATO prohibits Ukrainian capture of Russian territory.

NATO insists Ukraine confine hostilities to the 925-km Kupyansk-to-Kherson frontline …where Russians are implacably entrenched.

In the run-up to Ukraine’s June counter-offensive, NATO harangued Ukrainians into restricting attacks to designated areas. Thus, the counter-offensive consisted of futile ground assaults on kilometers-wide minefields. Slender gains came at a cost of 100,000 men and umpteen thousand vehicles. Logic dictates attacking weak-spots, not strongpoints. The counter-offensive was a NATO-ordained fiasco.

In this asymmetrical hybrid-warfare experiment Russia gets to bomb civilian infrastructure anywhere in Ukraine but Ukraine can’t fly homemade quadcopters over rural Belgorod. NATO won’t give Ukraine fighter-planes or long-range missiles because NATO won’t be party to attacks inside Russia. Americans “range-reduce” missiles before sending them to Ukraine. Those insignificant Ukrainian attacks on Russia territory, which do occur, are the work of rogue factions.

Sabotaging Ukraine’s war-effort tops the agenda during Putin’s monthly chats with CIA Director William Burns. Putin speaks with Britain’s MI6 more frequently. Putin also converses with several NATO leaders, and confabs with Erdogan and Orban – NATO lads both. To these cologned soirees add numerous clandestine encounters. Continuous dialogue finetunes the rules of engagement.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is a sports spectacle complete with designated playing field. It lacks a play-clock, however, thus appears interminable. NATO’s henchmen discombobulate Ukrainian war-planning. Putin blocks Russian victory. This tragicomedy threatens to go off-script at any moment and both sides are overdue for a coup.

Sources

• Frye, Timothy. Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2021. Quotations found herein can be found pages 109-12.
• Russo-Ukrainian War: What Zaluzhnyi Actually Wrote
• Putin signed a decree on autumn conscription (translated)
• Tass: Four fleets re-subordinated directly to Navy’s commander-in-chief — source