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Geography for an Iranian Blitzkrieg

New Security Doctrine


Khamenei’s “New Security Doctrine”--unveiled on Halloween--sparked a fortnight-long pronunciamiento wherein Iran’s siloviki acknowledged receipt by reciting the key directive: “respond without geographical restriction.” Reportage implies this Doctrine addresses specifically aerospace forces. It applies to all forces. It spells: Kuwait invasion.


Khamenei could quickly capture Kuwait. His armies dwarf Kuwait Land Forces (KLF) by a factor of forty. Moreover, Iranians embrace ground combat. Their generals bear scars from Iran’s horrific 1980-88 land war with Iraq which, among other things, spawned an array of indigenous fighting vehicles. Regarding infantry and artillery, Iran need only fear over-deployment. Geography facilitates surreptitious marshalling an hour from Kuwait’s borders. Iran possesses overwhelming amphibious superiority. Finally, Iran’s world-class aerospace force renders the blitzkrieg a cakewalk – 12 hours max!

Our 45,000-square-kilometer theatre trisects into:

· Kuwait (18,000-sq-k);

· Iraq’s Basra Governorate (19,000-sq-k); and,

· 8,000-sq-k of southwest Khuzestan (an Iranian province).

Kuwait is a triangle facing east onto a 290-k shoreline. Nine islands add 210-k of beachfront. Every meter requires protection from frogmen and gunboats.

Kuwait’s southern border offers a 220-k-wide escape to Saudi Arabia. A four-lane, 162-k coastal highway connects Metro Kuwait to the Saudi border. A separate three-lane, 117-k inland highway does likewise. Both run alongside vulnerable boundaries.

Iran must cross Kuwait’s 250-k northwestern border with Iraq. A 197-k concrete trench demarcates much of this line. (The untrenched portion lays along unpassable alluvial marsh.) The 4.5 X 4.5-m trench is backstopped by a parallel, similarly dimensioned, earthen berm. No fallback barrier exists between this berm and Metro Kuwait. Neither barrier, nor the desert betwixt barrier and Metro, are land-mined.

Kuwait is 100% urban. Metro Kuwait spans 1,500 sq k. Before the war it housed 5.1 million. Five gas-fired power/desalination plants supply 97% of electricity and water. Should Iran blast them, mayhem will engulf Kuwait’s 7,000-strong National Guard



Basra Governorate blankets Kuwait like a starfish on a clam. The Iraqi-Kuwait border is the Basra-Kuwait border. Kuwait touches no other Iraqi territory. To pinch the pearl, Iran must pry open Basra.

Basra (3.7 million) is 80% urban. Most live in a metropolis consisting of Basra City (1.5 million) and three conjoined cities, two of which sprawl along of the Shatt al-Arab Waterway’s west-bank. A mirror image of this cityscape appears on the east-bank where two Iranian cities line this 250-m-wide river.

The upper 60-k of Khuzestan’s border with Basra runs just east of the Shatt al-Arab Waterway. The lower 95-k dissects the Waterway.

Driving from Khuzestan to Kuwait requires traversing the Shalamcheh Border Crossing where drivers choose between Baghdad or Basra turnoffs. Seventeen kilometers down the Basra highway drivers may cross the Waterway via a highspeed bypass bridge; or, drive another 10-to-15-k to two city-center bridges.

Khuzestan’s Ahvaz (1 million) lurks 100-k from Shalamcheh. Pirooz anti-tank vehicles and/or semis towing field-guns could cruise from Ahvaz’s outskirts to Kuwait’s borders in three hours. Should this route remain open six hours after combat’s commencement, Iran will have more materiel inside Kuwait than Kuwait had at combat’s commencement.

While many fording opportunities appear along the Shatt al Arab, the stretch near Basra’s city-center bridges beckons mass infantry shuttling. These bridges are 50-k from Kuwait. One could swim from Iran and catch a cab to Kuwait in 30 minutes.

The first infantry to hit the trench, however, won’t be Iranian. The honor of performing the sappers’ surge goes to Basra-based pro-Iranian militias. Many live minutes from the trench. Arriving in Toyota pickups laden with jackhammers, dynamite, shovels and wheelbarrows they will lay red carpets for the Ahvaz convoy.



War-plans for mercs, Americans and the Kuwaiti ruling class all start with a mad scramble for that Saudi border

Our off-road drivability map is hourglass-shaped. Vehicles leaving Khuzestan either funnel into highways all the way to Basra City, or navigate labyrinths of pipelines threading around salt-marshes and silt-pits that swallow vehicles whole. Westbound traffic leaving Basra City bottlenecks further into a 15 X 15-k box centered on Az-Zubayr. Exiting Az-Zubayr, vehicles may fan-out--hardpacked gravel subsurface provides excellent offroad driving all along Kuwait’s barrier. Moreover, except for the avoidable Mukla Ridge, these conditions prevail right into Metro. (Average distance from barrier to Metro: 95-k; closest distance: 55-k.) Salamander dune-buggies could enter Metro in 40 minutes; unless Kuwait improvises a perimeter.

Iran’s 7,000-piece artillery arsenal includes 1,000 truck-towable M-46 field-guns. These guns fire six 34-kg rounds per minute. Shrapnel rounds have 30-m kill-radii. Rocket-assisted rounds have 40-k ranges. Reconnaissance drones greatly improve accuracy. M-46s and improvised perimeters don’t jibe.

Aerial defense of Kuwait will be an all-American act. Iran will divide US air power with simultaneous proxy blitzes in Djibouti, Lebanon, Israel, Iraq and Jordan; and with amphibious assaults on Bahrain and Oman. These initiatives should pre-occupy aircraft carriers (which are, already, too far from Kuwait).

US aircraft, with combat radii of 600-k to 1,200-k, will flyout from Israeli airbases over 1,200-k from Kuwait. Flying evasive, loitering maneuvres over Kuwait requires multiple mid-air refuelings per mission. Choreographing upper-tropospheric ballets requires more prep-time than blitzkriegs allow. Additionally, much US air-to-ground ordnance only works on stationary targets. Dispersed, mobile army units make difficult, uneconomical targets. Finally, Iran invests heavily in mobile anti-aircraft systems. In sum, the US cannot fly nearly enough missions to prevent Iran’s overrunning of Kuwait.

An immemorial ten months ago, America’s 16,000+ Kuwait-based personnel, together with elite KLF and Guard battalions, could have rapidly fielded 400+ armored fighting vehicles, plus hundreds of powerful, precise surface-to-surface missiles. They could have fulfilled their “tripwire” (stop-gap) mission. KLF now stands alone. KLF’s 15,000 troops are 80% foreign mercenary or stateless Bedouin.

Fewer than 500 US military personnel remain. They join similar numbers of US government employees and US-citizen gov-contractors--a veritable hostage trove.

War-plans for mercs, Americans and the Kuwaiti ruling class all start with a mad scramble for that Saudi border.


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William Walter Kay BA JD——

William Walter Kay, Ecofascism.com