Countering that argument in a dissenting opinion, Judge Gregory Katsas stated the Justice Department’s “all-encompassing” interpretation of the law would make it both “improbably broad and unconstitutional in many of its applications.”
In the amicus brief, Liberty Counsel argues that using a “document-shredding prohibition” such as Section 1512(c) in this manner “criminalizes large swaths of constitutionally protected expression” and runs “roughshod over the First Amendment.”
The brief stated the reason for the unprecedented application of Section 1512(c) was due to “prosecutors running amok” because they detested the “speech, assembly, and expression” of the people who aimed to influence their elected representatives on January 6.
Quoting Judge Katsas’ Appeals Court dissent, the brief notes that Section 1512(c) “has been on the books for two decades and charged in thousands of cases—yet until the prosecutions arising from [January 6th], it was uniformly treated as an evidence-impairment crime.” Noting another dissenting judge in a separate January 6 case, “it is “doubt[ful] whether, in enacting Section 1512(c), that Congress intended to supercharge a range of minor advocacy, lobbying, and protest offenses into 20-year felonies.”
As Liberty Counsel explains in the brief, other recent “expressive activities” that have disrupted official proceedings were not prosecuted under Section 1512(c). For instance, the individuals who violently assaulted the Hatfield Federal Courthouse in Portland, Oregon; the person who unlawfully disrupted Justice Bret Kavanaugh’s Senate confirmation hearing; and the anti-Israel protestors who stormed the rotunda of the Cannon House Office Building – all of which resulted in injuries to police officers or proceeding attendees – resulted in lesser charges including disorderly conduct or unlawful protesting.