The Exchange of Fire on the Northern Border

By Shlomo Brom The August 3, 2010 exchange of fire between the Lebanese army and the IDF, which led to causalities on both sides, ostensibly demonstrates the fragility of the ceasefire on the Lebanon border, in effect since the end of the Second Lebanon War in August 2006. The current incident dramatizes a scenario in which an erroneous calculation by one of the sides might spark a far reaching military conflict between Lebanon and Israel. In the media and in the Israeli political arena there were those who were quick to allege a connecting thread between this incident and the firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip to Ashkelon and from Sinai to Eilat and Aqaba. They concluded there was a guiding hand behind all of these incidents: Iran.

---

Examining the incident more carefully, however, suggests a different assessment. The first conclusion confirms the stability of the ceasefire on the Lebanese border, based on mutual deterrence between Israel and Hizbollah. The second indicates the lack of a connection between this incident and the rocket fire in the other sectors. Underlying this incident is the dispute between Israel and Lebanon over the demarcation of the Blue Line separating Lebanon and Israel, as well as Lebanon's political reality. In its unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, Israel withdrew to the Blue Line. This is not the international border agreed upon by Israel and Lebanon, although its route largely coincides with the 1923 international border. When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon, it fulfilled Security Council Resolution 425 calling on Israel to return to the recognized border between Israel and Lebanon prior to Operation Litani in 1978. This border, which was demarcated in cooperation with the UN, is called the Blue Line. Part of the Blue Line demarcation is accepted by Israel and Lebanon and is marked jointly on the ground, but there are still points of contention between the sides regarding the unmarked sections and how to translate the Blue Line in those locations into territorial markers. There are also places where due to topography the Israeli border fence is not situated on the border itself but within Israeli territory, with small pieces of sovereign Israeli land remaining on the Lebanese side of the fence. The Lebanese army has a tendency to view Israeli military activity beyond the fence as an infiltration into Lebanese territory, even if it occurs in these areas. In the August 3 incident, Israeli activity to clear vegetation took place in territory of this category, beyond the fence and in an area with no border marking. The Lebanese claimed after the incident that the route of the Blue Line at this particular point is under dispute. The Lebanese government could certainly have protested with more moderation and complained to UNIFIL about what it deemed was an IDF violation, instead of opening fire. However it chose to demonstrate a forceful policy and to instruct Lebanese army units in southern Lebanon accordingly. To be sure, there is a question as to whether there was a specific directive from Beirut to open fire in this particular case, but it is clear that the firm policy from Beirut's direction played a key role in decisions by the local Lebanese command. It seems the main reason for this policy is the political need for the Lebanese army to demonstrate that it – and not Hizbollah – is the defender of Lebanese sovereignty. In the game of internal Lebanese politics, Hizbollah justifies its military force as being Lebanon's defender. Thus Hizbollah rushed in to declare that after this incident, next time its forces would respond to an attack on the Lebanese army, this in order to underline the authenticity of its role as defender of Lebanese sovereignty. Both Israel and Lebanon hastened to prevent the incident from spreading and expressed their interest in maintaining stability along the border. The most interesting reaction was that of Hizbollah, which did not take part in the incident despite the harsh blow to the Lebanese army. Moreover, Hizbollah senior officials claimed the incident was an expression of Israel's desire to draw Hizbollah into a broad military confrontation. Apparently, Hizbollah has no interest in such a confrontation, at least at this time, and this reflects the extent of the mutual deterrence between Israel and Hizbollah that evolved in the aftermath of the 2006 war. This deterrence is based on the threat and capability of both sides to seriously damage the home front of the other. Hizbollah threatens to hit Israel's civilian population, not only in the north, while Israel threatens to strike Hizbollah's and Lebanon's prime assets. Hizbollah, which was accused of dragging Lebanon into a war that caused the country extensive damage in order to serve outside interests, is unwilling to pay the military or political price of a second round. For its part, Israel is not interested in inviting any more harm to its civilian population. This analysis indicates that the Lebanese army does not receive instructions from Tehran, and that the roots of the incident emanate both from the situation on the Lebanese border and from Lebanon's internal political situation. Therefore the fire at Ashkelon and the fire at Eilat are unconnected with this event, even if the coincidence of events creates the sense of a coordinated attack from several directions. Also important here is UNIFIL's role. If one of the two sides is interested in harming the other, it is not within UNIFIL's power to prevent it, nor is it within its mandate. UNIFIL serves as a mechanism to help prevent conflict eruption when both sides have no interest in friction. In this case it appears that UNIFIL, cognizant of the dispute between the sides, tried to prevent the incident. Although it failed in this regard, it played an important role in contacts between the parties intent on containing the incident and preventing its mushrooming. Thus the initial conclusion from the August 3 incident is that all of the involved parties – Israel, Hizbollah, and the Lebanese government – want to avoid being drawn into a military confrontation and hence will strive to contain points of friction. The second conclusion is that since the interest of all sides at this time is to minimize points of friction, efforts toward the precise demarcation of the Blue Line on the ground under UNIFIL auspices must be accelerated. The third conclusion is that UNIFIL fulfills a positive and stabilizing role, even if it is unable to satisfy exaggerated Israeli expectations – to forcibly prevent any attempt to strike Israel. Within the limited framework of the mandate under Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL is indeed functioning reasonably.