By: Yoel Guzansky
So far the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq has proceeded on schedule. At the same time, the uncertainty over whether elections will be held on time, the probability of heightened motivation to launch strategic terrorist attacks around the scheduled date for elections, Kurdish-Arab volatility, and external constraints such as more US soldiers in Afghanistan are liable to cause a situation whereby the continued withdrawal of forces at the present rate would challenge the relative stability achieved in Iraq over the last two years.
Barring any changes, American military activity in Iraq is expected, according to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), to end by August 2010, and US forces are expected to withdraw by the end of 2011. As of today there are 115,000 American soldiers in Iraq; since June 30 most of them are stationed outside urban areas (there were 160,000 soldiers stationed in Iraq at the peak of the surge). According to the American plan, the next stage is a gradual transition to “consulting with and assistance to” the Iraqi security forces, whose ability to take security responsibility for the areas to be evacuated is questionable. After August 2010, not more than 50,000 American soldiers are expected to remain in Iraq in combat support capacity; they will be joined by approximately 70,000 personnel associated with private contractors.
The level of violence in the area is linked, albeit not entirely, to the American withdrawal. Reinforcement of the American forces was in part responsible for the reduction of violence in 2007. Therefore, the withdrawal of the forces, as well as the decline in support of Sunnis opposed to al-Qaeda, is liable to result in a resurgence of violence. A violent outbreak around the parliamentary elections (which have been postponed again, to March 7, 2010), may require intervention by the American army, if only local, and make it difficult for General Odierno, the commander of the American forces, to meet the timetable for withdrawal.
The terrorist attacks in August and October and the attacks of December 8 targeted government offices and symbols of the Iraqi government, and are evidence of the terrorists’ intention to carry out "strategic" attacks that undermine the foundations of the regime. In the aftermath of the attacks, the Iraqi security forces were to a large degree dependent on the assistance of the American forces for evacuation of the wounded, security, intelligence, and so on. As the election date approaches, the motivation to carry out more attacks will likely rise in order to demonstrate the impotence of the government and its leadership in improving the country’s security.
The fixed timetable for withdrawing the American troops from Iraq is liable to be affected by a protracted process of establishing the government in Iraq after the elections. Since to date no political bloc is expected to win a majority, the work of putting together a coalition may be extended, perhaps even beyond the summer of 2010. After the parliamentary elections in 2005, several months elapsed until the government was established. In the interim, the political vacuum was used by terrorist organizations to increase their attacks, and a wave of sectarian violence ensued. The probability that the elections in Iraq will be canceled is low, but a postponement may require reorganization with regard to the rate and scope of the withdrawal.
Aware of the Iraqi security forces' limited capabilities, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has not ruled out the possibility of a continued American military presence in Iraq in order to train the security forces even after 2011. This would entail changes in the existing agreement between the countries in order to help Iraq get on its feet. However, it is possible that the new government formed after the elections will not favor the idea of a continued American military presence in Iraq and will request the withdrawal as per the existing agreement.
Although the American army has already withdrawn from most of the urban centers (27 in number), it is still playing a decisive role in the war on terrorism in the rural areas and along Iraq’s borders. To a large extent the Iraqi security forces are dependent on the American army for logistics, air support, and intelligence. Withdrawing at the present rate is liable to undermine the fragile achievements attained since 2007, and lead to the renewal of terrorist attacks and sectarian violence.
By the end of 2011, when the American withdrawal is due to be completed, Iraq will likely not be able to defend itself from itself and from its neighbors. Iraq still needs to build an effective air force that will be able to defend its skies (the Iraqi air force possesses a few helicopters and a number of reconnaissance and transport planes) and a naval force that will be able to secure the coast as well as Iraqi oil exports. Until then, there is no substitute for the presence of the American forces. As for internal security, it is clear that despite the steady growth in the number of Iraqi security forces (665,000 as of today), their qualifications and loyalties are still in doubt.
Even if the overall number of terrorist attacks has decreased, and in certain places even to levels unseen since 2003, as the American withdrawal progresses the terrorist organizations – with emphasis on al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia – will likely try to attack the American forces withdrawing in order to create the impression that the withdrawal is taking place under fire.
Similarly, the worsening Kurdish-Arab conflict, such as over the rights to the income from the oil fields in Kirkuk on the border of the Kurdish region, may impel the United States to extend its stay in Iraq in order to prevent bloodshed. Kirkuk, a volatile ethnic mosaic responsible for more than a third of Iraq’s oil output, was “liberated” by the Kurds in 2003 after the fall of Saddam, and has since then been a bone of contention between Baghdad and Arbil regarding control of the city and division of the oil profits. The proximity of the Peshmerga and the government forces, as well as unilateral steps taken by both sides on the ground, may touch off a crisis that would be difficult to contain. To date, the presence of American forces has greatly prevented further deterioration of the situation, making clear the need to arrive at a political formula that would satisfy both sides before the withdrawal is completed. Indeed, it was primarily the American effort that helped achieve the compromise agreement on the manner of the vote in Kirkuk, which allowed the passage of the elections law in its current format.
The withdrawal from Iraq is also related to the situation in Afghanistan and heightened US military efforts there. A hasty withdrawal from Iraq with an eye to the effort in Afghanistan is liable to challenge the relative stability in Iraq, lead to increased violence, and ultimately postpone the withdrawal in order to impose order. Conversely, any delay in the withdrawal from Iraq will make reinforcement of the forces in Afghanistan more difficult. President Obama recently announced his intention to reinforce the 68,000 troops already stationed in Afghanistan with an additional 30,000 troops by the summer of 2010, coinciding with the withdrawal of the combat forces from Iraq.
Despite the difficulties liable to arise from Iraq’s internal political situation, the level of violence, and Kurdish-Arab tensions, the withdrawal is gathering its own momentum, and will be difficult to stop. President Obama’s determination to withdraw the troops at the current timetable might erode the achievements of the last two years and end the relative calm prevailing in Iraq. Neither the Americans nor the Iraqis are interested in US troops remaining in Iraq indefinitely. Yet while extending the American presence does not guarantee success, a premature withdrawal will necessarily create a security vacuum and make the withdrawal even more dangerous to Iraq than was the incursion. Therefore, the United States will be required to incorporate a measure of flexibility into its exit strategy that will allow it to cope more easily with existing constraints, even if this ultimately means extending America’s military presence in Iraq.
