The Palestinian Decision to Engage in Proximity Talks with Israel

Shlomo Brom On March 3, 2010, the Arab League foreign ministers’ follow-up committee, meeting in Cairo, adopted a decision supporting the start of “proximity talks” between Israel and the Palestinians. At stake are negotiations that would be conducted in a similar format to that of the Israel-Syria negotiations with Turkish mediation during Prime Minister Olmert’s term in office, i.e., with the negotiating teams situated in the same city while the Turkish mediator moved between them.

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In this case, it is likely that the American mediator, former senator George Mitchell, would shuttle between Jerusalem and Ramallah. The decision allotted a four month period to this process, and also stipulated that the talks would not become direct unless Israel fulfills the demand for a total freeze on construction in the settlements. On March 7, as a result of this decision, the PLO’s Executive Committee approved the resumption of talks in the proposed format. In the meantime the Israeli Interior ministry notification that it approved a new large building project in a neighborhood of Jerusalem that is beyond the 1967 border is causing a delay in the actual start of the proximity talks. There is also a risk that this incident will completely derail the very idea of starting proximity talks, although the US administration is investing much effort to overcome the repercussions of the Israeli announcement. After over 15 years of direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians, the transition to proximity talks represents a clear regression, reflecting the gulf of distrust between the Palestinians and the current Israeli government. Amr Musa, the Arab League secretary, also referred to the distrust of Israel when in his opening remarks he related to the decision of the Arab foreign ministers: “Despite the lack of trust regarding the seriousness of the Israeli side, the committee has decided to give a chance to indirect talks as a last opportunity and in order to allow the United States to fulfill its role.” The American decision to initiate proximity talks is a direct result of the great difficulty for the two sides to resume negotiations. This difficulty is a function of both the distrust the Palestinians feels towards Israel’s leadership and of the error made by the American administration when it demanded a full and complete freeze of the settlements, which it felt was an auspicious way to renew the negotiations. This was a demand that Prime Minister Netanyahu could not accept, yet pushed President Mahmoud Abbas into a position from which it was difficult to backtrack. If the American administration demanded a freeze in the settlements, clearly Abbas could not renew direct talks in the absence of such a freeze without suffering a severe political setback. The proximity talks are a means of allowing Abbas such a retreat; it is a way of conducting negotiations without their looking like negotiations. The decision on the part of the Arab foreign ministers was meant to support this approach and help Abbas tackle the criticism, already voiced both by Hamas and by circles within his own Fatah movement, for his decision. It appears that the Palestinians also decided to accept the idea of proximity talks and initiated the supportive resolution of the Arab League once they received a number of promises from the American administration. In the document given to the Palestinians in response to their questions about the indirect talks initiative, the United States reportedly made a commitment to the PA that if one of the sides should fail to fulfill American expectations, it would make its concerns clear and would act accordingly in order to overcome the hurdle. The significance is that the United States would not only pass messages between the two sides but would also provide ideas of its own and bridging proposals. The administration also responded to the Palestinians that its central objective is the establishment of a sovereign, independent, and viable Palestinian state based on contiguous territory, which would end the occupation that began in 1967. This formulation does not include a clear obligation to return to the 1967 borders and repeats prior statements made by Secretary of State Clinton. Proximity talks are cumbersome and less effective than direct talks. They also grant the American mediator more power and freedom to decide how to transmit the respective messages and how to advance its own bridging proposals. The result would probably be that the sides would direct their messages towards the Americans rather than towards one another, and there is a risk that the primary goal of the two sides would be to reach a position whereby each would be able to blame the other side for the negotiations’ failure and have the Americans substantiate the claim. The proximity talks will have fulfilled their function only if they can become direct talks after a relatively short period of time. This transition is liable to be difficult if the Palestinians continue to insist on their demand for a full freeze on settlements. In a sense, the Palestinian decision indicates the end of a fairly relaxed period in terms of the Israeli government’s relations with the United States. As long as Abbas refused to renew the talks, Israel could claim that the deadlock in the political process was the Palestinians’ fault. Once proximity talks are underway, Israel will no longer be able merely to make general declarations about its willingness to put the two-state solution into practice, but will have to present concrete positions on the key issues: borders, security, Jerusalem, and the refugees. In light of the fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu has already declared on several occasions that the positions put forth by former prime minister Olmert in negotiations with the Palestinians are unacceptable to him, it is likely that the talks will hit a snag soon after their start. In such a crisis, it is likely that the United States will side with the Palestinians and not with Israel because the latter is the one retreating from prior positions. The Israeli government will have to formulate a way to tackle such a crisis, perhaps by proposing alternatives to a full agreement with the Palestinians. At this stage, Abbas is opposed to any alternative that is not a full permanent agreement. Indeed, the document given to the Palestinians reportedly stressed that the administration has noted that the Palestinians are not interested in realizing the option of a state with temporary borders, as called for the Roadmap. Beyond the significant gaps between the positions of the two sides, the talks are also liable to be affected by an intensification of friction between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank as a result of various decisions and statements made by the Israeli government, adding to the Palestinian frustration with the political stalemate. Possible effects of the unhappy mood of the Palestinian public is evidenced by a recent public opinion poll taken by the Palestinian institute PCSR, whereby some 40 percent of respondents support the renewal of an armed intifada, a sharp increase from the less than 10 percent who answered affirmatively to the same question in 2006. Internal criticism of Abbas because of the renewal of talks will increase and will complicate the situation if he is seen by the Palestinian public as someone who enters into talks with Israel at a time when the latter is stepping up its oppression of the Palestinians and the “theft of their land." If Israel wants the talks to take place, it will have to take steps to help calm the West Bank and East Jerusalem.