The Source of Failure: Israel’s Public Diplomacy and the Intelligence Community

Hirsh Goodman It took between 12 and 14 hours for release of the tapes showing Israeli soldiers being beaten in a coordinated and planned attack aboard the Mavi Marmara.

---

That footage, if released earlier, might well have drastically changed the international perception of what happened aboard the ship. The picture could also have been dramatically different had it been made known to the media in advance who was aboard that ship, as well as the truth regarding the nature and affiliations of the organizations behind the mission and the identities of those on board – intelligence that Israel presumably had, having closely followed the case of the flotilla for six months. Israel should have used this information effectively even before the flotilla left port, perhaps taking the rhetorical and theatrical wind out its sails. But this did not happen. The image the world ultimately received was exactly the opposite of the truth, i.e. the picture the flotilla organizers would have the world believe. As a result, Israel is faced with yet another public diplomacy failure with major strategic consequences: jeopardized relations with an important neighbor, Turkey, and newly-strained relations with Europe, the Arab world, and even the US. At the heart of this incident, as well as the downfall of Israeli public diplomacy in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza (December 2008-January 2009), is the gap between the people who have the materials to make Israel’s case, the intelligence community, and those who have to make it, the public diplomacy community. Obviously not all intelligence materials can be released to the public if it implies putting sources or a mission at risk. But in the specific case of the flotilla, it is far from clear that the materials showing the brutal attack on the Israeli commandos were withheld for these reasons. It seems that a major reason for withholding the pictures may have been the concern in the military that their disclosure would lead to demoralization in the army, not to speak of public criticism. In consequence, the military, with appropriate government approval, withheld the videos, a correct decision perhaps from the army’s perspective, but a bad one for the country’s international relations. The army is not responsible for the country's public diplomacy – the government is. It knew about the materials, but accepted the reasoning of the military, which has a distinctly different way of looking at the world. The government was also aware of who was on the ship and the nature and history of the organization behind it, the IHH. It knew about the compliance of the Turkish government in the incident, the senior Hamas officials aboard (the head of Hamas in Europe, for example), and terrorists with known extreme Islamic affiliations allegedly being smuggled into Gaza to train Hamas in the use of advanced technologies and bomb making. Days later, now that this information has been released, world public opinion is beginning to sway toward Israel’s advantage, but the damage was immense. Exposing the nature of the people detained, the history and goals of the Islamic organizations involved, the crudeness ("go back to Auschwitz") of the ship’s radio responses to Israeli calls warning it not to proceed to Gaza, the Turkish role, and the organized and life-threatening violence that met the descending troops could have put an entirely different perspective on the narrative that went out to the world had that information been made available to the people responsible for Israel's public diplomacy. Unfortunately, it was not, making months of planning in the Foreign Ministry and prime minister’s office on how the flotilla challenge would be met virtually useless. The core and source of the problem is to be found, not unexpectedly, in the intelligence community, not through any ill-will but by virtue of the nature of that community: secrecy, discretion and the single-minded purpose of helping the armed forces achieve their mission. It is not that the intelligence services are blind to Israel's public diplomacy needs; it is simply not on high enough on their agenda. Hence the reticence about the "activists" on the ship and their ultimate purpose in embarking to Gaza. This has to change. In this day and age and the reality of intrusive, 24-hour, multi-channel news outlets, where speed and beating the competition is everything – rumor, spin, and manipulation rule, as was so dramatically demonstrated by the flotilla incident. Both in Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which led to the Goldstone commission, and in this incident, the need for materials that will help Israel make its case are crucial. This is no longer a question of image, but in the context of post-Goldstone realities and the concerted campaign to besmirch Israel and de-legitimize the country, it is probably as important, if not more so, than the conventional battles Israel faces. As a result of this campaign, Israel faces economic, artistic, and academic embargoes, continuous attacks in the UN, and other world forums. It undermines our allies, especially in the Arab world, where anti-Israel sentiment it at a peak, and embarrasses our friends It is time for those in the intelligence and security communities to switch gear when it comes to information sharing. There is a growing awareness that this is needed, but concrete action in this regard still needs to be taken. Israel has in place the necessary public diplomacy structures to make Israel’s case effectively. But without ammunition they are powerless.