Withdrawal from the Golan Heights in Stages

Shlomo Brom According to recent report,[1] in a meeting held a few weeks ago with a group of British policy analysts, Syrian foreign minister Walid Muallem said: “For peacemaking, Israel needs to be ready to recognize that Syria is entitled to every inch of the Golan, but we wish to engage in talks." "For us," he continued, "the land is sacred and a matter of honour." Later in the meeting, he mentioned a possible outline for withdrawal from the Golan Heights in tandem with stages of normalization with Israel:

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"There could be stages of withdrawal, the timing of which could involve a form of normalisation," he said. "Half of the Golan could lead to an end of enmity; three-quarters of the Golan, to a special interest section in the US embassy in Damascus; a full withdrawal would allow a Syrian embassy in Israel." According to Muallem, key issues such as Syria's support for Hamas, Hizbollah, and relations with Iran would "only be answered after withdrawal."

From the manner in which the remarks were presented, one might infer that a new Syrian approach was introduced, namely, that Syria was prepared for a gradual process with Israel that would include agreement on interim arrangements and their implementation before achieving a final settlement that would involve full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. On the face of it, this could suit the approach of those in the Israeli government who reject a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and certainly before an extended period of confidence building between the two sides. According to this position, it is preferable to work towards a non-aggression pact between the two sides in exchange for a partial withdrawal from the Golan Heights instead of a full peace treaty at the cost of a full withdrawal. However, a careful reading of the statements, especially the connection between the first – that Israel must commit itself to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights – and statements that followed, demonstrates that this interpretation has little basis in reality and that the stance presented by the Syrian foreign minister is in line with Syria’s traditional positions on an agreement with Israel. Rather than referring to various stages of negotiations, Foreign Minister Muallem apparently referred to stages of implementing an agreement after a final peace treaty between the two nations is signed, which includes Israel's agreement to a full withdrawal from all territory conquered in 1967. In previous negotiations, Syria already agreed to a plan whereby the implementation of the withdrawal from the Golan Heights would occur in stages over a number of years. The period of time that was mentioned in this context was two and a half years. In his statements to the British group, Muallem proposed that normalization would also occur in stages; Syria would not necessarily wait until the completion of the withdrawal before starting normalization. This too is not groundbreaking news because it primarily reflects Syria’s lack of trust in Israel. Once Israel has already agreed to full withdrawal from the Golan Heights and a full treaty has been signed, there is no reason not to institute full peaceful relations and delay the exchange of embassies unless Syria does not really believe that Israel will fulfill its commitments. Furthermore, the Syrian foreign minister's reference to normalization is not encouraging because he gives it a narrow interpretation, mentioning only the establishment of diplomatic relations. In this too there is little new: in fact, in the course of previous negotiations there was already a stage at which there was willingness to enter into a discussion about additional elements of normalization. The same is true regarding the Syrian foreign minister’s reference to relations with Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas. He proposes that discussion of these issues take place after the signing of a peace agreement and a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. In doing so he is completely ignoring an essential change that has occurred on the Israeli side. Today, the primary motivation among the Israelis to enter into negotiations with Syria and reach a peace agreement is a desire to breach the Syrian-Iran-Hizbollah-Hamas axis and sever Syria’s harmful relations with these entities. Israel will not sign a peace agreement until it is convinced that this would be the outcome. Indeed, from a legal and formal perspective, it is inconceivable that a peace agreement would be signed by the two states that would not ban each side from engaging in military and intelligence cooperation with entities that are hostile to the other side. One should not conclude from these reservations about interpretations of Muallem’s statements that there is no importance to what he said. First of all, his statements reflect Syria’s consistent desire to renew negotiations with Israel and arrive at a peace agreement with Israel, on condition that the agreement includes full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Syria’s leadership repeats this wish in every meeting with foreigners, including in public. Second, his statements largely reflect Syria’s desire to maintain the understandings the two sides already achieved in prior negotiations. Muallem, himself a partner to the negotiations in their early stages, is intimately familiar with these understandings. It is not clear that the Israeli negotiating team, whose members frequently rotate as governments change, is equally familiar with these understandings. [1] Gabrielle Rifkind, “A Route to Resolution for Syria and Israel,” The Guardian, February 26, 2010,