The Colombian Army stays the course under Juan Manuel Santos

The two large billboards stand a kilometer apart, on either side of Carrera Septima to greet northbound and southbound drivers. The signs display colored paintings of the Colombian Armed Forces in action and the caption, "Fe en la causa. Comportamiento etico y mejor", or, "Faith in the cause. Ethical and superior behavior". Like bookends, the billboards bracket the Colombian army base that fronts this section of highway in north Bogota.

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The billboards are part of a 2011 "national faith campaign" for the Ejercito Nacional, or National Army. The campaign, conceived in 2010 and implemented this year, is a political, as well as practical, new strategy to give morale to the soldiers and promote more ethical behavior with higher goals, concepts, and challenges. On paper, it is a comprehensive, conceptual document, based upon four fundamental pillars of Colombian life: God, the man, the family, and the Nation. It stresses human rights, transparency, respect for self and others, and leadership. The doctrine holds commanding officers accountable for strengthening their subordinate soldiers in specific areas such as leadership, spiritual dimension, military vocation, institutional culture, and organizational communication. Clearly, the campaign is Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos' response to the domestic and international criticism of the Army's human rights violations of the last 10 years. It is a progressive departure from the previous administration of Alvaro Uribe. Criticized during his campaign for being a clone or puppet of Uribe, Santos is clearly a different man. Whereas Uribe was defiant, defensive and wholly consumed with defeating the FARC, Colombia's oldest and largest terror group, Santos as president is more diplomatic, conciliatory, and has acknowledged the military's transgressions.

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Indeed, Santos' political critics contend that Faith in the cause is political window dressing and that Santos has allowed the domestic security situation to deteriorate. Regardless of Santos' motive, the campaign is more than a public relations ploy; Faith in the cause demands professionalism and seeks to reform the military----instilling accountability to avoid the sins of the past which cast the Colombian Army as human rights violators, paramilitary collaborators, and extrajudicial killers. The Army, under Uribe’s Democratic Security platform, hammered the FARC and effectively marginalized them as a major threat to the country. The FARC had met their match with Uribe, whose father had been killed by the terrorists in a 1983 kidnap attempt. Uribe’s zeal to defeat the FARC resulted in major operational successes (lead by Santos as Defense Minister) against the FARC, and chronic human rights violations in the countryside. Despite the abuses, the Colombian Army, viewed over time, has generally performed professionally, despite facing over 50 years of multiple, committed insurgencies and the near-loss of the State to the narco-mafias. Colombian soldiers have the right to be confused with the timing of the Faith campaign. During Uribe’s tenure, 2002-2010, Colombia became much safer. By 2008, Uribe’s Comadante General of the Army predicted that the FARC would be near-extinct within a year because of the capture of major FARC leaders. That prediction has proven premature, and the Army’s National Faith Campaign is ironic because it comes amidst a three year increase in lethal attacks by the FARC. A new report by Nuevo Arco Iris, a Colombian non-governmental organization, details a resilient, decentralized FARC which has adapted to the Army’s current “high value target” strategy and restructured itself into smaller, more agile groups, including snipers and explosives experts. Writing in the July 17th edition of El Tiempo, Nuevo Arco Iris members Leon Valencia and Ariel Avila highlight the results of the group’s investigation into the current dynamics of the conflict with the FARC. Using investigators in the field, Nuevo Arco Iris observed the dynamics of the confrontation between the armed forces and the FARC in the first six months of 2011 in 19 departments, then compared the findings with those of the previous two years. The investigation defines different zones of intensity within the country, actually describing the military forces as having adopted “defensive strategies” in Cauca, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Caqueta, and parts of Antioquia. The report acknowledges the debate about whether the Santos’ administration has “let down the guard” in respect to the FARC. However, the writers conclude that there is no evidence of a change in intensity of mission, though they did find some miltary detachments fatigued by extended operations caused by the new guerilla tactics. The investigators witnessed limited Colombian Army collaboration with the illegal armed group ERPAC in the eastern plains of the country while the Army was scattering the FARC. The Nuevo Arco Iris investigators did not observe nor report any instances of human rights violations by the Army. The investigation revealed an increase in attacks by the FARC over the first six months of 2011 and noted that this was a continuing trend of lethal attacks since 2009. The increase was not due to the change in government in 2010. The report indicates a 10 percent annual increase in attacks over each of the previous two years. The attacks were characterized as a change in strategy for the FARC, which was adapting to the military’s aggressive search for FARC leader Alfonso Cano by extensively deploying landmines and using hand grenades. These tactics slowed the advance of the military forces and prolonged operations. Twelve car bombs attacks were highlighted in the report as a dangerous trend in FARC weaponry. (On July 9th, the FARC perpetrated a horrific car bombing in a public market in Toribio, southern Colombia, killing three people, including a police officer, and wounding 70 people. By the end of the day, at least five other neighboring villages had been attacked.) The Nuevo Arco Iris report indicates the war with the FARC is far from over for the Colombian military. The complexity for the Colombian soldiers is evident in fighting an asymmetrical war with an enemy that has no regard for the rules of war and human life. The upward trend in attacks by the FARC is the likely response of an actor trying to survive under continued pressure. As with most such wars, the inferior power will evolve and change tactics in response to the superior power which abides by the rules of war. Despite the prolonged surge in terror attacks by the FARC, it is clear the Colombian Army is fighting a restrained, measured battle while redefining itself as an ethical, superior fighting force under the mandate of President Juan Manuel Santos. Jeffrey Haire is a law enforcement writer from Los Angeles, California. Jeffrey Haire graduated from San Diego State University with a BS degree in Criminal Justice Administration and spent 20 years as a police officer in Los Angeles, California. He obtained a masters degree in clinical psychology from Pepperdine University in 2005. He is a law enforcement analyst and focuses on international policing issues, specifically in Colombia and Mexico. He has extensive travel experience in Latin America, and he has written about crime, drug policy, and policing in the Bogota Free Planet as well as other international journals including Colombia reports.com and the Latin American Post.

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