INSS

United States-Israel Relations: Is Anything Forever?

The 112th Congress, elected in November 2010, convened on January 5, 2011. Various Israeli elements have expressed satisfaction with the election results – a resounding defeat for the Democrats and President Obama and a rise in the GOP’s power – because they believe that Israel can take advantage of the Republicans’ achievement to curb undesirable ideas and initiatives by the administration. Time will tell if their assessment proves right.

Israel and the US Administration: A Midterm Assessment

There has recently been much discussion of the State of Israel’s “bleak diplomatic situation,” and a dismissal of Israel's foreign policy over the last two years as a string of failures. The declaration by a number of South American countries that they recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders ostensibly proves this assertion.

Russia: A New Look at the Peace Process

Russia has recently taken a renewed interest in the Middle East peace process. Several factors apparently led Russia to conclude that the time is ripe to raise new proposals: Russia is finding itself sidelined in the process; its sense of self-confidence is returning; and it apparently assesses that the international standing of the United States is weakening and the current peace process has reached a dead end.

The (Hillary) Clinton Outline: A Fundamental Turning Point?

In her December 10 speech at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton surveyed the current state of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in light of the administration’s failure to renew direct talks between the two parties. This failure has led to severe criticism of the Obama administration.

The Question of an Israeli Apology to Turkey for the Flotilla Episode

The positive dynamics generated by Turkey's assistance in combating the enormous forest fire on Mt. Carmel and the discussions in Geneva between Turkish and Israeli representatives raise again the issue of an Israeli apology to Turkey for the results of the forced takeover of the Mavi Marmara. On the one hand, the position represented by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman contends that not only is an apology to Turkey surrender to terrorism, but that in any case no gesture will rebuild the relationship. The opposing claim argues that Israel’s strategic interests in the region direct it to swallow its pride and apologize. In light of the most recent contacts between Israel and Turkey it appears that Israel is tending towards an apology. If that is indeed the case, the focus shifts from the question of whether Israel should apologize to the question of how and for what. The contents, form, and context of an apology in the political arena are of utmost importance.

In the Wake of the Carmel Fire: Another Opportunity to Construct a Strategy of Preparedness

The massive fire on Mount Carmel (December 2-5), the most severe in Israel's history, shed a disconcerting light on the status of the emergency services in Israel and the degree of preparedness of the civilian front for extreme crises. Although the poor situation of the fire services is presently the subject of public criticism, it is imperative to expand the scope of the discussion and use the unfortunate events as an opportunity to draw conclusions and formulate a holistic strategy that will significantly improve the capacity to face future challenges.

From Zero Problems to Zero Sum Game and Back: Towards a Thaw in Israel-Turkey Relations?

Israel viewed Turkey's dispatch of firefighting planes to help put out the enormous forest fire on Mt. Carmel very positively. It brought about the first significant breakthrough toward mending the broken Israel-Turkey relations since flotilla affair this past May. Israel's forced takeover of the Turkish Mavi Marmara led to a freeze in relations that were already tense, partly the result of Turkey's response to Operation Cast Lead. The positive dynamics created by Turkish aid to Israel reflect a certain desire on the part of both states to resolve the crisis, though it is uncertain if this is enough to clear the hurdles on the way to a significant improvement of relations.

The Self-Defense of Middle Eastern Conservative Regimes, and Israel’s Role

Although there is no direct link between them, both the recent elections in Jordan and Egypt and the WikiLeaks publications are instructive regarding the determination of conservative regimes in the Middle East to defend themselves and enhance their survivability.

A Family Affair: The Generational Turnover and the Stability of the Saudi Kingdom

The lack of transparency regarding succession in Saudi Arabia has fueled speculations about who will succeed 87-year-old King Abdullah, currently receiving medical treatment in the United States. The royal house is making extraordinary efforts to project a business-as-usual image, but since June the king has in fact greatly cut down on his schedule, and he has been described by some diplomats as “confused and unfocused.”

2010: The Nuclear Spider Comes of Age

When states and organizations crave good news in the area of nuclear proliferation prevention, they may be wont to ignore the bare facts or misinterpret them in an optimistic vein. This in turn creates a sense that there is still time in which to effectively stop the production of fissile materials for the production of nuclear weapons.

The NATO Summit: The Day After

“An historic encounter; a turning point in the history of the organization” was how some of the NATO leaders assessed the summit in Lisbon (November 19-20, 2010). The focus of the summit was approval of the new strategic concept that will underlie the organization’s activities in the coming years. Other issues on the agenda were a plan of action for Afghanistan and relations with Russia. Like the other documents arrived at by consensus, the approved document embodies the broadest common denominator. Differences of opinion between the twenty-eight member states on all issues were not included in the document, yet these will continue to preoccupy the organization.

Israel’s Coping with the al-Aqsa Intifada:  A Critical Review

Introduction

The al-Aqsa intifada erupted as a grassroots uprising and was fought between an occupying state and a people aspiring for national liberation and self-determination.*1 According to international law, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were held under “belligerent occupation,”*2 where the ruling power is the military command – especially since Israel retained authority over much of the area, as well as control over the access routes in and out of the territories. Israel and the Palestinians understood the essence of the violence, which evolved from an uprising to an armed conflict, differently: once it escalated, Israel saw it as an existential conflict*3 imposed on it, and therefore used all the military means it deemed necessary to protect itself and to “exact a price” from the Palestinians. The Palestinians initially saw the violence as a legitimate popular uprising against the occupying party, with the goal of breaching the political stalemate and gaining independence. From their point of view, it was an asymmetrical conflict: Israel resorted to its definitive military superiority, which could only be offset with “significant operations” (amliyat naweiya), such as suicide attacks.

2000-2010: An Influential Decade

Looking back at the past ten years several decades from now, it may well be that this period will emerge as among the most important in the history of the Arab—Israeli conflict. Processes and events that occurred over the past ten years may well prove to be among the most decisive. Naturally, analyzing processes by decades entails an artificial division into chronological units, and is done only for the purpose of sharpening perspective. Clearly some of the processes began before the beginning of the decade and some will certainly continue into the next decade. Moreover, the selection of issues that are considered decisive and having shifted the balance is by no means exhaustive, and other observers of the period might choose to modify or expand the list.

The End of the Second Intifada?

Introduction

Researchers, pundits, politicians, and other interested parties have suggested various start and end points for the second (al-Aqsa) intifada. For its launch, many have focused on the last week of September 2000, while others see the seeds of violence having been planted months earlier, surrounding the collapse of negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat at Camp David in July of that year.*1

Resuming the Multilateral Track in a Comprehensive Peace Process

Since his speech in Cairo in June 2009, President Obama has yet to make any significant progress in the Middle East, whether with respect to relations with Syria, the Iranian nuclear program, stabilization in Iraq, or the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. His most recent project – bringing Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Mahmoud Abbas into effective direct negotiations – is fraught with obstacles, and even after the parties agreed to move to direct negotiations the potential for success in the negotiations remained slim.

Sudan on the Verge of Division? The Referendum, Oil, and Foreign Involvement

A referendum in Sudan scheduled for January 9, 2011 stands to determine no less than the creation of a new state. Southern Sudan, rich in oil and populated mainly by Christians and animists, will decide whether to split off from the primarily Muslim north, poor in oil and striving to impose shariya law on the country. The conflicts threatening the unity of Sudan are not unique, and in general, how ethnic groups and tribes in the Middle East divide their oil profits impacts on the region as a whole. However, the situation in Sudan is particularly severe and is liable to deteriorate into a renewed civil war. The sides are arming themselves heavily and seek the support of external players who have substantial interests in Sudan.

The Political Process Entangled in the Triangular Gordian Knot

Ten years after the outbreak of the second intifada, the American administration, backed by the Quartet, once again called upon Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to renew a direct dialogue. The talks, as defined by the administration, were intended to advance the principles of a final status agreement within a year. A response to the challenge will require that the parties labor to overcome the wide gaps in their basic positions. Moreover, the institutional rift that has deepened in the Palestinian arena during and because of the years of stalemate presents serious obstacles to any future attempt to implement principal understandings, even if they are successfully formulated.

The Disengagement Plan: Vision and Reality

Behind the Disengagement Plan

A plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, which was drafted and implemented during Arik Sharon’s tenure as prime minister, included withdrawing IDF forces from the Strip, evacuating the entire Jewish presence in the Katif bloc, and dismantling four settlements in Judea and Samaria: Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, and Homesh. Once publicized, the plan shocked the Israeli public. The notion of withdrawing the IDF from the Gaza Strip had long been debated, and many felt that Israeli settlements there were an exercise in futility. Three basic claims underpinned this idea. One, Gaza is of no religious or historical significance to the Jewish people. Two, the Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip would always remain a demographically marginal and geographically isolated enclave in the heart of the most densely populated Palestinian region. Three, in terms of security, Israeli settlement activity in the Gaza Strip is of little importance.*1

The Rise and Fall of Suicide Bombings in the Second Intifada

Yoram Schweitzer The decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seen several rounds of violence and has claimed many casualties on both sides. The second intifada*1 occupies a particularly painful place, especially for the Jewish population, which suffered an unprecedented high casualty toll – dead and injured – in a relatively short period of time.

The Core Issues of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Fifth Element

By Shiri Tal-Landman The first bilateral political conference to address the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the July 2000 Camp David summit, ended with a resounding failure that to a great extent encouraged the outbreak of the violence of the second intifada. Exactly one decade after the Camp David fiasco, the permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were again launched with much pomp and celebration – and accompanied by much skepticism.