INSS

The Saudi Arms Deal

Yiftah Shapir, On August 13, several reports appeared in the US media on plans by the Obama administration to sell arms to Saudi Arabia valued at $60 billion over a period of ten years. The reported deal is supposed to include 84 F-15S jets, approximately 60 AH-64D Apache Longbow assault helicopters, and about 70 UH-60 Black Hawk utility tactical transport helicopters. The deal will also include simulators, upgrades for existing fighter jets, and training and maintenance packages.

Ten Questions for the Negotiators with Iran

By Ephraim Asculai In view of the possibility of renewed talks between Iran and the “Vienna Group” (the US, France, Russia, and the IAEA) one cannot but wonder whether this will be “the real thing” or another Iranian time-buying ploy. Although at first Iran delayed the opening of talks, it later recommended to the Vienna Group not to delay the talks. Contrary to the talks that started with the P5+1 in Geneva on October 1, 2009 that were supposed to deal with the whole spectrum of issues between Iran and the rest of the world, the Vienna Group dealt only with the “swap” – the proposed deal whereby in exchange for 3.5% Iranian enriched uranium Iran would receive 20% enriched uranium in the form of nuclear fuel rods for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Iran first agreed to this deal, then opposed, then agreed to a more favorable (to Iran) deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey, but not accepted by the US.

The Exchange of Fire on the Northern Border

By Shlomo Brom The August 3, 2010 exchange of fire between the Lebanese army and the IDF, which led to causalities on both sides, ostensibly demonstrates the fragility of the ceasefire on the Lebanon border, in effect since the end of the Second Lebanon War in August 2006. The current incident dramatizes a scenario in which an erroneous calculation by one of the sides might spark a far reaching military conflict between Lebanon and Israel. In the media and in the Israeli political arena there were those who were quick to allege a connecting thread between this incident and the firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip to Ashkelon and from Sinai to Eilat and Aqaba. They concluded there was a guiding hand behind all of these incidents: Iran.

A Repeat Performance: Hamas, Israel, and the Political Process

Anat Kurz, In late July 2010, a few weeks before the end of the four month period allotted for the Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks, President Obama called again for a renewal of the direct dialogue between the parties. The responsibility for renewing the negotiations was placed equally on Israel and the PA, although over the past few months a slight change was evident in the atmosphere surrounding the international, and especially the American, effort to put a meaningful political process on track.

ArabLeague Endorsement of Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: Arab Activism or Political Theater?

By Mark A. Heller At first glance, the reluctance of Palestinian Authority President and Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to move from proximity talks (which have not really been held in close proximity) to direct negotiations with Israel seems incomprehensible. But things are not necessarily what they seem.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Netanyahu and Direct Talks with the Palestinians

By Zaki Shalom Listening to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s remarks the past few months regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, one cannot help but wonder: Netanyahu seems to be going out of his way to open direct negotiations with the Palestinians as soon as possible. The prime minister has said he is aiming for intensive negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement (the “agreement in stages” approach, explains Netanyahu, has failed and will not resume). According to Netanyahu, the situation in the Middle East is “fluid” and the future of key states like Iran, Turkey, and Egypt is unclear. This volatile state of affairs, he stressed, provides a window of opportunity to reach an agreement, and therefore it is incumbent on the Palestinians to abandon their belief/illusion that a third party, i.e., the United States, will drop a ready-made agreement into their hands. There is no substitute for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

Iran: The Course is Almost Run

By Ephraim Asculai and Emily B. Landau The pattern of international efforts to confront Iran's nuclear program has become all too familiar. The West – first the EU-3, and later the US – leads “diplomatic processes” to nowhere; Russia and China go back and forth between Iran and the West, reluctant to take too harsh a stance against Iran's ongoing defiance, and agreeing only to belated and weak UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions; and the IAEA continues to pose questions to Iran about the military dimensions of its nuclear program that Iran avoids answering, while at the same time it continues to install and run additional uranium enrichment cascades. The Iranians are successfully playing for time, and time is on their side. All sides are hesitant to firmly pronounce the Iranian nuclear program as weapons-oriented, and Iran senses that its target is almost in sight.

Can Israel be Extricated from the Gaza Triangle?

By Shlomo Brom In the course of the public debate in Israel following the interception of the Gaza flotilla, Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz proposed that Israel seal all crossings into Gaza entirely, while Egypt open the Rafah crossing that separates Egypt from the Gaza Strip. According to this proposal, all goods traveling into and out of Gaza would go through the Rafah crossing. The plan did not receive much attention in Israel because it seemed not practical, but the Egyptian government responded harshly, saying Israel could not shirk its responsibility for the Gaza Strip. This Egyptian response is highly indicative of the tangled reality of Israel-Egypt relations within the Israel-Egypt-Gaza triangle.

The Iranian Challenge: Synchronizing the Political and Technological Clocks

By Yoel Guzansky In a recent appearance before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Meir Dagan, head of the Mossad, claimed that while the Iranians are still seeking nuclear capabilities as a strategic objective, "they have encountered far more difficulties than expected and failed to advance as they had hoped technologically."[1] It is not clear whether Dagan was referring to technical difficulties at home or foreign difficulties, i.e., external intervention designed to affect the timetable for achieving a nuclear weapons capability. Gary Samore, Obama's advisor on arms control and proliferation, also claimed recently that there is "a significant delay in the uranium enrichment process, which is influencing Iran's ability to produce nuclear weapons."[2]

The Cloud’s Silver Linings: The Flotilla to Gaza

By Zaki Shalom Although too little time has elapsed since the flotilla episode to allow full perspective, it is already clear that the operational failure involving the takeover of the Mavi Marmara and the international criticism of Israel's action have damaged Israel's international standing, its image as a law abiding state, and its strategic relations with Turkey and other countries. This is the newest expression of a reality that has accompanied Israel over the years: in the given circumstances, an operational mishap, even if confined to a narrow tactical level, can sometimes have far reaching strategic implications. While presumably this is understood by the decision making echelon in Israel, it is less clear to what extent this has been internalized within the operational echelon.

The Source of Failure: Israel’s Public Diplomacy and the Intelligence Community

Hirsh Goodman It took between 12 and 14 hours for release of the tapes showing Israeli soldiers being beaten in a coordinated and planned attack aboard the Mavi Marmara.

Russia-Iran Relations: Is There a Change?

Zvi Magen The May 17 signing of the agreement to transfer uranium between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil met with sweeping opposition on the part of the Security Council and aroused new international unrest. The day after the signing, the Security Council’s permanent members, including Russia and China – both of which were surprised by the development – signed a proposed resolution to impose sanctions against Iran. Since then, they have been working to curb the Turkish-Brazilian initiative.

The Nuclear Fuel Deal: A Gift to Iran?

Ephraim Asculai, and Emily B. Landau, On May 17, 2010, Iran, Turkey, and Brazil signed an agreement on a swap of 1,200 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) from Iran in return for 20% enriched uranium reactor fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Should the agreement materialize, it would be an important gain for Iran. Iran would receive fuel for a reactor that while today is used for the production of radioisotopes for medical uses, was previously used for weapons-related research activities: plutonium research and polonium-210 production, whose only use is in nuclear weapons. In fact, the medical radioisotopes can be commercially obtained from several sources, and would not fall under any sanctions.

The Euro Crisis and Ramifications for Israel

- Nadav Kedem The financial crisis in Europe raises several economic and political questions, including the effect on the European Union in general and relations between EU states in particular, as well as the possible impact on Israel.

Opening Bids and Conflicting Agendas

Emily B. Landau Judging by the initial dynamics, the stakes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) that began on May 3 are high. The basic positions of the different parties remain very much as they were at the last RevCon, held in 2005: the US wants to focus primarily on the ongoing challenge of NPT violators, especially Iran; the non-nuclear weapons states demand that the nuclear states do more to address their NPT commitments – both to disarm and to allow transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the non-nuclear states; Egypt is leading the non-aligned states in pushing for implementation of the non-binding 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and Iran continues to insist that it is a member of the NPT in good standing while hurling accusations in all directions. But important developments since 2005 have created a changed context for the interface of these conflicting interests and agendas, and the end result of the conference is likely to be quite different from 2005.

Friction in the Gulf: The Disputed Islands and Iran’s Push for Regional Hegemony

Yoel Guzansky, and Emily B. Landau In an unusual statement, the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates recently compared the Iranian occupation of the three Gulf islands it claims – Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb – to “the Israeli occupation of Arab land.” Both the highly irregular statement and the sensitive analogy dramatize the concern in the Gulf that Iran, under the aegis of its nuclear program, seeks to dominate not only the region’s agenda but also Arab territory.

Nuclear Terrorism: Threat to the Public or to Credibility?

Jonathan Schachter, Yoel Guzansky, and Yoram Schweitzer During a recent trip to Prague, where he signed a new arms control treaty with Russia, President Barack Obama declared that nuclear terrorism is “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” Though the unique destructive power of nuclear arms justifies his concern regarding their spread and potential use, this grave assessment regarding the imminent threat of nuclear terrorism does not appear to stand up to scrutiny, and might even set the stage for weaker international non-proliferation resolve in the future.

The Saudi Nuclear Option

Yoel Guzansky On the basis of a memo written by the US Secretary of Defense, the New York Times reported recently that “the United States does not have an effective long-range policy for dealing with Iran’s steady progress toward nuclear capability.” On the same day, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia issued a royal order establishing a science complex called King Abdullah City dedicated solely to “research and development of all aspects of nuclear energy.”

Muddling the Iran Issue

Jonathan Schachter, Emily B. Landau,, and Ephraim Asculai On April 17 the New York Times revealed that in January US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote a memo to National Security Adviser James Jones on the need to develop policy options regarding Iran’s drive to develop nuclear weapons.

The Importance of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

Tamar Malz-Ginzburg The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which the presidents of the United States and Russia signed a few days ago in a festive ceremony in the ancient castle in Prague, is a continuation of START I, signed between the United States and the former Soviet Union in July 1991. The treaty dealt with a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads and the means of launching nuclear weapons. This is likewise the stated purpose of the new treaty: to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenal of both countries. The treaty also allows the continuation of the attempt to control the proliferation of fissile material from Russia to hostile elements – one of the primary goals of the original START.