WhatFinger

Russia would like to upgrade its status in the region

Israel and Russian Foreign Policy



By Magen, Zvi The international community has of late demonstrated active political engagement in everything concerning the Middle East. There is heightened anticipation of strategic developments, whether political or military.

The backdrop is the conduct of the American administration and its attempt at dialogue with the Muslim world, including an attempt at direct talks with Iran, and renewed efforts to jumpstart the political process between Israel and its neighbors. At the same time, the constant deterioration of the Iranian nuclear issue and the ongoing, comprehensive confrontation with radical Islam continue. Amidst this activity, Russia has not remained on the sidelines. Russia is demonstrating significant political activism, motivated by the desire to become an influential player internationally. It seems that Russia is not resigned to the loss of its superpower status, and is working hard to restore its former glory. In recent years this ambition has been the leitmotif of Russia’s foreign policy, which has striven to achieve parity within the existing international community, or to change the current world order so as to create a multi-polar system. The Middle East has increasingly been the focus of Russia’s attention, both because it is becoming a new arena of competition with the United States and because of the ongoing deterioration of the Iranian crisis. Over the last two decades Russia has gradually rehabilitated its status in the Middle East that was lost with the breakup of the USSR, primarily via cultivation of relations with the radical camp, including Iran, Syria, and non-state entities such as Hamas. However, this is not enough to grant Russia the position of influence it seeks. Regarding the central issues of the region, the United States remains the leading player, thus neutralizing Russia’s efforts to achieve parity. Russia would like to upgrade its status in the region and upset the United States position of dominant regional player. It is still hard to point to impressive Russian achievements in the Middle East; far from it. It is clear to Russia that it is not going to win entry to the Middle East arena only from it current partners. Beyond the agreement of the international community, there is also the need for cooperation from all the elements, and in particular the moderate countries in the region – including Israel. Israel is seen as a central axis in the moderate Middle East camp, at least with regard to the Iranian threat, and as an element capable of allowing Russia to integrate into the political processes in the region on equal footing with the United States, for example, by agreeing to hold an international conference over Middle East affairs in Russia. Russia sees Israel as a friendly country that shares something of its own spirit. The current positive relations reflect the conjoined efforts of influential factors – political, economic, even demographic – with Russia explicitly announcing that it feels a sense of responsibility for the over one million Russian-speaking Israeli citizens, recent immigrants to the country. Still, Israel is not viewed in a vacuum but rather in the context of Russia’s comprehensive Middle East policy, and relations with Israel are built relative to Russia’s regional and global political considerations. In this context, the bilateral relationship assumes secondary importance, and it is no accident that Russia's achievements in this area are far from optimal. Beyond this, Israel is viewed by Russia as the United States’ ally and as such is not expected to cooperate with Russia in promoting its objectives in the region. Russia sees it as a challenge to attempt to change this reality, if only in part. While its efforts to include Israel in its realm of influence are unending, Russia’s higher priority is to forge cooperation with the Arab world. Indeed, despite Israel’s clear interest in viewing Russia as a friendly nation and even a political ally, since the renewal of diplomatic relations, bilateral relations have never gone beyond a very limited scope, with the exception of some specific aspects. Against this backdrop, the most recent developments in relations between the two nations – including bilateral activity, generally behind the scenes; the meeting between Presidents Peres and Medvedev; Prime Minister Netanyahu’s secret visit to Russia; and contacts at various levels between ministers and senior envoys – seem to signal a turning point. In addition to Russia’s interest in becoming actively involved in the Middle East peace process, recent Russian-Israeli contacts suggest the possibility of a Russian initiative in formulating new operational proposals for this process or even a more far-reaching possibility, such as the attempt to mediate between Israel and one of Russia’s radical partners in the Middle East. If so, this could augur a real breakthrough in Middle East affairs, or at least a positive Russian effort to find ways to exit the Middle East quagmire. At the same time, however, Russia is careful to continue developing its positive relations with the opposite camp: its sweeping support for Iran continues, even though at least superficially it seems that there is cooperation with the international community to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Its sweeping support for Syria also continues, and it is also clear that Russia is making significant efforts to exert its influence vis-à-vis the Palestinians. While Russia’s ambivalent activity, which is not new in terms of Russia’s international practice, may reflect attitudes to the different nations, including Israel, as tools for promoting Russian interests in the international community, it is nonetheless Russia’s way to reach across all the influential powers and elements that do not allow for simple, unilateral solutions. Russia must formulate a policy that will allow it to appear as the only element in the Middle East that has the capability of speaking with all the parties about all the issues. Such capability would give Russia a relative advantage over the other players and help it upgrade its international status. However, the missing factor in the Russian equation is Israel. To date, its efforts have not borne appreciable fruit from Russia’s perspective, and now is the time for a new attempt. Given the changing international reality, it appears that Israel too is more ready to examine new proposals. For Israel, Russia was and still is an important country, both in the international context and bilaterally. It is in Israel’s interest to generate changes in Russia’s current policy, based as it is on sweeping support for Israel’s enemies, and to encourage Russia to work towards finding a foundation for positive international cooperation in the Middle East.

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Institute for National Securities Studies, INSS is an independent academic institute.

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