With only a month left in her position of power, California Senator Diane Feinstein abused her position by putting out a one-sided report that says the CIA shouldn't do things that they're not doing any more.
Giving only the accounts of those critical of a CIA program that is no longer in operation, Democrats on a Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Senator Feinstein, published their last chance at besmirching the G. W. Bush administration. Republicans will have the Senate majority in January, so Democrats will no longer head up all committee assignments.
By starting from the assumption that enhanced interrogation produced no results, the Democrats use circular reasoning then to "prove" their point. In other words, the "proof" that opponents of enhanced interrogation are correct is the assumption that enhanced interrogation is wrong.
Republicans on the committee published their minority report that was a wholesale refutation of
Feinstein's report:
"With respect to the standard of objectivity, we were disappointed to find that the updated Study still contains evidence of strongly held biases."
"We found that those biases led to faulty analysis, serious inaccuracies, and misrepresentations of fact in the Study. For example, the Study states, "At no time during or after the aggressive interrogation phase did Abu Zubaydah provide the information that the CIA enhanced interrogation were premised upon, specifically, 'actionable intelligence about al-Qa'ida operatives in the United States and planned al-Qa'ida lethal attacks against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests.' " Specifically, our review of the documentary record revealed that Abu Zubaydah provided actionable intelligence, after he was subjected to "aggressive" interrogation in April and August 2002, that helped lead to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al- Qa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 1, 2002. These captures effectively disrupted the al-Qa'ida plot to bomb certain named hotels in Karachi, Pakistan, that had been selected because they were frequented by American and German guests."
"The Study falsely claims that "[a] review of CIA operational cables and other CIA records found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of 'Jose Padilla' or the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records indicate that: ... (3) Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI officers who were using rapport-building techniques, in April 2002, more than three months prior to the CIA's 'use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques' "
"However, CIA records clearly indicate that during the time period when FBI agents and CIA officers were working together in rotating, round-the-clock shifts, some of the interrogation techniques used on Abu Zubaydah included nudity, liquid diet, sensory deprivation, and extended sleep deprivation. Specifically, sleep deprivation played a significant role in Abu Zubaydah's identification of Jose Padilla as an al-Qa'ida operative tasked to carry out an attack against the United States. Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI agents during an interrogation session that began late at night on April 20, 2002, and ended on April 21, 2002. Between April 15, 2002 and April 21, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was deprived of sleep for a total of 126.5 hours (5.27 days) over a 136 hour (5.6 day) period—while only being permitted several brief sleep breaks between April 19, 2002 and April 21, 2002, which totaled 9.5 hours. Thus, all information provided by Abu Zubaydah subsequent to his return from the hospital on April 15, 2002, was obtained during or after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and cannot be excluded from supporting the CIA's effectiveness representations under the Study's flawed analytical methodology. Over the course of his detention, Abu Zubaydah provided 766 sole-source disseminated intelligence reports."
"CIA records demonstrate that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques during two separate periods in April 2002 and August
2002. During these timeframes, Abu Zubaydah made several photographic identifications of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and provided information that bin al-Shibh had been in Kandahar at the end of2001, but was then working with KSM in Karachi, Pakistan. More important, Abu Zubaydah provided information about how he would go about locating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates in Karachi. This information caused Pakistani authorities to intensify their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al-Qa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002."
"We found...that representations about the thwarting of an attack against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, specifically President Bush's 2006 comments that 'Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti,' were accurate and have been mischaracterized by the Study.
"Specifically, contrary to the Study's assertions, the President did not attribute the thwarting of this plot exclusively to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, but information from '[t]errorists held in CIA custody.'
"In addition, the President never stated that the plot was disrupted exclusively because of information from detainees in CIA custody. The President was clear that information from detainees 'helped' to stop the planned strike. This idea that detainee reporting builds on and contextualizes previous and subsequent reporting is repeated a few lines later in the speech, when the President makes clear, '[t]he information we get from these detainees is corroborated by intelligence . , . that we've received from other sources, and together this intelligence has helped us connect the dots and stop attacks before they occur.' "
One of the few articles that actually referred to the Republicans' minority report was from a UK news source, the
Daily Mail:
"Additionally Democrats' study doesn't provide adequate context about the terror threats facing the U.S. after 9/11 in the two years that followed, they said, which places the CIA's actions in rosier light:
" "In reviewing the information the CIA provided for the Study, however, we were in awe of what the men and women of the CIA accomplished in their efforts to prevent another attack,' they concluded.
" 'The rendition, detention, and interrogation program they created, of which enhanced interrogation was only a small part, enabled a stream of collection and intelligence validation that was unprecedented.The most important capability this program provided had nothing to do with enhanced interrogation—it was the ability to hold and question terrorists, who, if released, would certainly return to the fight, but whose guilt would be difficult to establish in a criminal proceeding without compromising sensitive sources and methods,' they stated."
