By Guzansky, Yoel
Far from the public eye and the media, the importance of Yemen as an arena of struggle between regional powers is growing. The primary threat to Yemen in recent years is linked to the ongoing fighting in the country’s northwestern region.
Fighting erupted again in early August, adding another dimension of instability to a country already confronting a separatist struggle in the south and global jihad activity, and that has lately become a way station for smugglers of arms destined in part for Hamas.
As part of the current (sixth) round of fighting, government forces are attempting to put down the rebellion led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi, whose men are in control of the mountainous Sa’dah province in the northwest, near the border with Saudi Arabia. There has been periodic fighting since June 2004, with each wave of combat increasingly brutal, resulting in thousands of injured and massive damage. Although there is no foundation for the Yemeni government’s claim that the three uprisings – the separatists in the south, the strengthening of jihadists identified with al-Qaeda, and the Shiite rebellion in the north – are united against it, their combination is worrisome. The current violence threatens not only Yemen’s unity and stability, but also the security of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula. It joins the growing attempts of organizations identified with al-Qaeda to take on the Yemeni government as well as the Saudi royal house, as may be inferred from the attempted recent terrorist attack originating from Yemen that targeted the Saudi royal family. In this attack, Prince Naif, one of the kingdom’s leaders in the war on terror and the son of the number three man in the Saudi hierarchy, was lightly injured.
To a large extent the fighting of the Yemeni government against the Houthi rebels represents a microcosm of the religious, social, economic, political, and regional tensions seething underneath the surface. From afar, one could presume that the conflict is an armed struggle between armed groups and the government – a local Yemeni issue – but the struggle has additional layers, among them the struggle between the Iranian-led radical bloc and the bloc of pragmatic countries, led in part by Saudi Arabia.
The last round of fighting erupted as the result of the collapse of the ceasefire, which went into effect on June 16, 2007, and the breach of the official agreement signed in Doha on February 2, 2008, with the mediation of the emir of Qatar, al-Thani. According to the agreement, the government was supposed to compensate people injured or otherwise affected by military actions, assist in the rebuilding of the villages that sustained damage, and cease from further military attacks. In exchange, the Houthis pledged to lay down their weapons and preserve the peace in the province. Despite the reduction in the scope of fighting, sporadic clashes between the sides continued, even after Yemeni president Saleh declared a unilateral ceasefire in honor of his 30 years in office, possibly knowing that he was incapable of putting the uprising down.
While the rebels belong to the Zaydi sect of Shiite Islam, a somewhat different Shia current than customarily found in Iran, Iran did not hesitate – according to the Sana’a government – to support the rebels as early as 2004. Senior Yemeni government officials have on more than one occasion accused Iran of supplying weapons, financing, and training to the military wing of the rebels, the al-Shabab al-Mum’en (Believing Youth). Last week, the Yemeni minister of information al-Louzi accused “foreign elements” of providing the Shiite rebels in Sa’dah province with economic and political assistance and with “harming Yemen’s security and stability.” Moreover, it was announced that Minister of Foreign Affairs Kirbi met with the Iranian ambassador to Sana’a in order to “warn Iran about steps that the Yemeni government would take… in response to the fact that media elements identified with Iran are fanning the flames of the conflict and are in practice serving as tools for the rebels…This situation, should it continue, will have negative implications for the Iran-Yemen relationship,” added the minister.
In a step that could be interpreted as support for the rebels, Iran's minister of foreign affairs Moutaki, who met with the Yemeni ambassador to Tehran, expressed “deep concern for the situation of the Shiites in Yemen,” while emphasizing the importance of correct relations between the government in Sana’a and the Shiites in Yemen. In recent weeks, media sources identified with Tehran have reported that the Saudi air force is involved in bombing rebel strongholds within Yemenite territory (also in an attempt to prevent the fighting from spreading to within its own borders), and that Saudi Arabia has even promised Yemeni president Saleh to finance his war against the rebels. Saudi Arabia has not officially responded to these reports, but Saudi newspapers frequently accuse Iran of aiding the rebels. In the current round of fighting, both sides have rejected a ceasefire proposal; the government has claimed the latest offer has "nothing new in it” and countered by presenting a list of demands of the rebels: open blocked roads; remove landmines and booby traps; retreat from the stronghold in the mountains; return stolen equipment; release captives, and cease all involvement in internal politics.
According to the Yemeni government, the fourth round of fighting (February-June 2007) was touched off by Houthi threats against the Jewish community in Sa’dah, claims refuted by the rebels. Nonetheless, in the wake of persecution, the government moved a number of Jewish families from Sa’dah to Sana’a and reportedly provided them with housing.
What are the rebels’ demands? In general, they seek greater autonomy over their own affairs, as well as the release of their imprisoned supporters and an end to attacks by the security forces and the ongoing repression, which they claim defines the government’s attitude towards them. They oppose the growing warmth and increased cooperation between Yemen and the United States, especially on the fight against terrorism, as well as Saudi intervention in Yemen’s internal politics. The rebels charge that Saudi Arabia is financing the Yemeni government and aiding Sunni tribal elements.
Because of the media blackout, the precise number of losses on either side is not clear, but it is known that the Yemeni government is using its armored troops, artillery, and airpower to quash the uprising once and for all (according to an announcement made by President Saleh), and perhaps also to signal the separatists in the south that the government is determined to fight for national unity. Estimates are that some 100,000 residents, mainly women and children, have fled their homes, but the intensity of the fighting, the nature of the terrain, and the government blackout make it difficult both for UN aid forces and for the media to enter the combat zones.
Even if the accusations by Iran and Saudi Arabia are more propaganda than fact, the warfare is not only an internal threat against Yemen’s unity, but also a growing threat to Saudi Arabia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the entire region. To a great extent the fighting is turning Yemen into another arena of struggle (highly important because of its strategic location) between the pragmatic Sunnis seeking to include Yemen in their midst and radical Shiite Iran, which is seeking to expand its regional influence and establish a presence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa arena. Iran has increased the presence of its navy in the Gulf of Aden area (claiming it aims to deal with the rising piracy in the region). It is also advancing its political influence and bolstering its economic links with Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea in a way that will allow it to maintain an active military presence in the Red Sea and afford Iran the option of using this military presence against Israel.
Unlike its neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf that also want to curb Iran’s influence, Yemen is incapable of effectively controlling all of its sovereign territory, and this provides various radicals with free access to the Gulf states, the Horn of Africa, and the countries along the Red Sea. Yemen has also recently invited renewed interest because of American military concerns of al-Qaeda’s attempts to set up a regional base. About a month ago, US CENTCOM commander General Petraeus visited Yemen and pledged to help the government prevent terrorism. It is not clear if the US is also assisting the government in Sana’a against the uprising in the north, and if the visit included this objective.
Even if the conflict in Yemen is far from TV screens, it has major regional significance. Beyond Yemen’s internal stability, it is another test for the ability of the pragmatic nations to curb Iran’s regional influence. Thus even if the current outbreak of violence ends with another ceasefire, its stability will likely be tested before long.
