Lebanon’s Parliamentary Elections

- Amir Kulick The parliamentary elections in Lebanon on June 7, 2009 featured two main electoral camps. One, the "March 14 alliance," comprised the Sunnis, represented by the al-Mustaqbal (“Future Movement”) Party headed by Sa’ad al-Hariri; the Druze – the Progressive-Socialist Party headed by Walid Jumblatt; and various Christian elements, among them the Phalangists and the Lebanese Forces. Opposing them was the "March 8 alliance," composed of the Shiites – Hizbollah and Amal; "The Free Patriotic Movement,” the party of the Christian Maronite politician Michel Aoun; and other small factions such as Sleiman Franjieh’s Christian party from northern Lebanon.

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The March 14 coalition won the elections, earning 69 seats, compared with the 57 won by the March 8 coalition; these and the two independent representatives total 128 parliamentary representatives. Despite early assessments of a close race, the March 14 candidates won by a landslide in a number of provinces. Thus in the 1st voting district in Beirut, March 14 candidates won every seat (of the 7 in contention); similar results were found in Zahle (5) and Kura (3). Hizbollah and Amal even saw a reduction of their parliamentary power: 25 representatives in the new parliament compared with 29 in the outgoing. Nevertheless, in practice, the power of the opposition has increased somewhat, now numbering two more representatives (57 compared with 55 in the outgoing parliament), while the power of the coalition has waned somewhat (69 representatives compared with 72). Lebanon and the world were surprised by the results: the prevalent expectations were that Hizbollah and its allies would win. These assessments were backed by opinion polls, which predicted a slim majority for the March 8 camp. Moreover, it seemed that the victory of these factions was a natural development given the spirit of the times: the weakening of the status of the United States and its Arab allies, compared with the strengthened influence of Iran and its allies – Syria, Hizbollah, and Hamas. The West's failure to root out the Taliban; American’s Iraqi quagmire; the disintegrating international pressure on Syria; Iran’s continued progress towards a nuclear capability; Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections; and Hizbollah’s relative success in the Second Lebanon War formed a smooth backdrop for a Hizbollah victory in the Lebanese elections. And yet the elections resulted in a victory for the pro-Western camp. How can this development be explained and what are its ramifications? It seems that several factors are behind Hizbollah’s weaker showing. One of the main sources for the surprise lies in the assessment that the success of the March 14 camp in the previous elections incorrectly reflected the true balance of power in the Lebanese political system, as they were held shortly after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 and the ensuing public outrage at Syria’s allies in Lebanon – Hizbollah and the March 8 camp. It was suggested that the balance of power between the vying blocs was actually even, perhaps slightly favoring the March 8 camp, and the 2009 elections were supposed to restore the political order to its correct alignment. A second factor may lie in the Lebanese system itself. At the center of this explanation stands Michel Aoun’s failure to enlarge his power base in the Christian sector. Aoun, head of the Free Patriotic Movement, was the surprise of the previous elections. Just before those elections, he had returned to Lebanon from an extended exile in Europe, yet managed to win 18 seats in the parliament. (In practice, his party was apparently bigger because it earned the support of a number of independents.) Different estimates, especially those within his own close circle, maintained that in the current elections his power would grow significantly because most of the Christian sector ostensibly stood behind him. There were even projections that the party would double its power and win 30 or more seats. The changes in the voting districts made under Hizbollah pressure in the Doha Agreement of May 2008 were supposed to help Aoun attain this goal. In practice, Aoun failed to garner additional support, and his party even lost one mandate. In this sense, the gap between the expectations of the Free Patriotic Movement with Aoun at its head and the actual results is significant. A third factor behind Hizbollah’s poor showing – at least compared to expectations – was its inability to reach beyond the borders of the Shiite community and become a national political establishment acceptable to large segments of the Lebanese public. While in the Shiite strongholds in the south and in the Lebanon Valley (the Baalbek and al-Hakmal regions), Hizbollah and Amal candidates won most of the seats allotted to the Shiite sector, in other districts where Hizbollah ran candidates running (especially in Beirut) they failed. Hizbollah’s inability to become a national power accepted by all other communities is likely found in the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and no less so in the events of May 2008. Following the IDF’s withdrawal from the security zone in May 2000, Hizbollah enjoyed great popularity among the Lebanese public. The resistance was seen as an historic Lebanese achievement, and Hizbollah seemed poised to become a political entity that to a great extent would rise above sectarian differences of opinion. The 2006 war rendered a severe blow to this image. The kidnapping of IDF soldiers and the subsequent war were seen by large segments of the Lebanese public as a colossal mistake motivated by external interests. Hizbollah was considered an Iranian tool in Tehran's war on the United States and Israel. The "Weapon of Resistance," Hizbollah’s independent military wing, which until then was seen as an asset, suddenly seemed a burden that was dangerous to Lebanon’s wellbeing. This suspicion was validated further by the events of May 2008. As a result of the disagreement with the government about Hizbollah’s attempt to set up an independent communications network and install cameras at Beirut’s airport, violent confrontations between Hizbollah fighters and government supporters erupted. Within a few days, Hizbollah conquered neighborhoods in West Beirut, as well as areas in the north and east of the country. Eighty civilians were killed in the fighting. Following Qatari mediation, a compromise agreement was signed in Doha whereby Hizbollah and its ally Michel Aoun scored noteworthy political gains. Nonetheless, it seems that the May 2008 violence significantly damaged the organization’s national image and demonstrated to the Lebanese public – the Sunnis and the Christians – that the Weapon of Resistance is no less dangerous to the Lebanese than to Israel. It is still too early to pinpoint the likely implications of the election results on the Lebanese political system and the regional arena. To judge by statements issued by Hassan Nasrallah and his spokesmen, in the short term Hizbollah will seek to make sure that the new government will not act against Hizbollah’s military wing and make any decisions that breach the status quo. In order to achieve this, the organization will probably attempt to establish partnerships in the government or at least receive some kind of political guarantees. For the long term, it seems that the elections clarified for Hizbollah the limitations imposed on it by the principle of sectarian division in the Lebanese confessional political system. According to the confessional system, each community is awarded a set number of seats in parliament (64 Christian, and 64 Muslim divided into 27 Sunnis, 27 Shiites, 8 Druze, and 2 Alawis). Similarly, senior political positions are divided on a community basis (a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, and a Shiite speaker of parliament). Therefore, the results of the elections will likely underscore for both Hizbollah decision makers and Iran that in order to realize their strategic goals regarding Lebanon, the political system in the country must be organized in a more egalitarian way to realize the Shiites’ growing demographic weight. How this change is to be achieved – whether through the Weapon of Resistance or through political compromise – remains an open question for the moment. Yet in any event, the most recent elections, despite their importance, are no more than a milestone in a long term struggle for the character of Lebanon, or as Nasrallah phrased it, a station on the road to fulfilling “a great program of reforms at all levels – political, security, economic, and social.” When and how that program is to be fulfilled is not clear, but the Shiites' demographic growth and the military might of Hizbollah constructed under the aegis of Iran and Syria are definitely liable to ensure that at the end of this reform Lebanon will look very different.