The Internal Conflict in Iran

-Ephraim Kam In a number of respects, the current internal conflict in Iran should be the source of much concern to the leaders of the Islamic regime. Demonstrations and riots erupt in Iran every few years, protesting primarily intervention by the regime in the life of the individual or the economic situation. However, in terms of the number of participants, the duration of the disturbances, the number of casualties, and the expression of anger and determination by the participants, recent events exceed all previous episodes since the 1979 revolution.

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This time the demonstrations were not aimed only at President Ahmadinejad – limited student demonstrations against him have taken place in the past – but also at Spiritual Leader Khamenei. In the past Khamenei managed to stay above the internal debates and conflicts, but here he took a stand and supported the “election” of Ahmadinejad as president and thereby became a side in the conflict. Rivalry – almost since the day the regime was established – has often marked the regime’s leadership. However, this time some of the rivalries came out in the open, and as the serious crisis raged, some senior members of the regime, including former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami and presidential candidates Mousavi and Karroubi stood up to Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. Moreover, there also seems to be a split in the religious leadership: a number of senior clerics abstained from expressing their support for the results of the elections and for Ahmadinejad, and some even expressed support for Mousavi. However, the more serious grounds for the regime’s concern are the depths of the unrest. The election results were only a catalyst for the outburst, and the roots of crisis lie in the desire of a large part of the Iranian public, mainly young people and women, for a change in the regime. They demand less repression and intervention by the regime in personal lives, liberalization of the political system, greater freedom of expression, an improved economic situation, and eradication of government corruption. This demand has grown under the Ahmadinejad presidency, when over the last four years the regime restricted individual freedoms further and intensified the repression – this with the backing of the religious leader and the support of the Revolutionary Guards, which in military, political, and economic terms have become the most important force in Iran. The regime apparently did not correctly assess the depth of frustration and anger, and did not expect such a powerful outburst. For now the regime is displaying confidence and despite the unrest, is controlling the situation. After about a week of violent demonstrations the regime managed to limit their scale and force, mainly through a combination of brute force, arrests, and scare tactics, even though the protests continued. It did not, meantime, agree to any real concession to the protestors’ demands. It agreed to a recount of ten percent of the votes and an examination of the polls where votes were allegedly rigged (which clearly in no case will alter the results of the election) and refused outright to cancel Ahmadinejad’s election and hold new elections. Other means of repression have not yet been tapped: thus far the regime has mainly called on the police force and the Baseej militia, which are answerable to the Revolutionary Guards. It still has the ability to deploy the Revolutionary Guards on a massive scale and to arrest the leaders of the protest, including Mousavi, and possibly even Rafsanjani (whose daughter was arrested for a short time) if the riots intensify. It is too soon to determine if the demonstrations are actually subsiding, as it appears now, or whether they will gain new momentum. In the current circumstances, the more likely albeit not certain scenario is that the riots will continue to die down gradually in the coming days or weeks, even if there may be some outbursts of protests. The reason for this is twofold. First, the regime has years of experience in suppressing demonstrations and has the means to do this now as well. Second, the masses who took to the streets displayed clear determination in the face of the force used by the regime, but they lack serious organization and leadership. The demonstrations were largely spontaneous and did not rely on an organized system, and the regime appears to have succeeded in scaring the masses from continuing their protest. Mousavi has become the leader of the protest, yet it is questionable whether he has sufficient ability to lead a revolution, and many recall that his term as prime minister during the 1980s was one of the darkest in the history of the Islamic regime, when thousands of opponents of the regime were executed. Yet even if the demonstrations diminish soon, the pressure for changing the regime will remain under the surface and will likely erupt again, sooner or later. Moreover, the crisis has battered and scarred the regime; its standing has been damaged, both domestically and externally. The cameras have shown, to the regime as well as to the world at large, that millions of Iranians do not want the regime, its policy, or its leaders. Even though the regime intends to swear in Ahmadinejad again as president soon, his legitimacy will be damaged, just as Khamenei’s standing may be damaged, at least in the near future. Thus the potential for changing the nature of the regime remains, even if supporters will have to wait for another opportunity. In the face of this unrest the regime will have to examine itself carefully in order to prevent a renewed outburst. It is difficult to assess how the regime will act, especially as it itself has yet to decide what to do. There will likely be little if any change in its foreign and defense policies, as these were not the reason for protest. The regime may even look to boast the achievements in its nuclear and missiles programs and its military might, in order to divert attention from the internal turmoil. The willingness of the Obama administration to adhere to a strategy of dialogue with Iran will help Iran repair the damage its image has suffered in the international arena. Above all it is on the domestic front that the Islamic regime will have to take stock of itself. In addition to the measures the regime is likely to take to weaken the reformist camp, it is expected to act to reduce the grounds for protest. As it will be difficult to reduce the scale of economic distress in the short term, the regime might focus on limiting its intervention in the life of the individual and ease repression, at least to a degree. It may even bring reformist ministers into the government. The implications of the crisis for Israel will be limited, as the posture towards Israel is not expected to change as long as there is no substantial change in the nature of the regime. As the Obama administration intends to try to engage directly with Tehran notwithstanding the internal events in Iran, there will be no change in the approach to the Iranian nuclear issue and at this stage preference will be given to the political approach. Even so, with Ahmadinejad’s continued presidency and against a backdrop of fierce criticism of Iran’s suppression of the protestors, it will be easier for Israel to explain the meaning of the Iranian threat, and a more comfortable base may emerge for imposing additional sanctions if dialogue with Iran fails.