Historical experience shows that a decisive military success cannot be attained over an insurgent people, and it is impossible to sear values into its consciousness that signify the relinquishment of national rights and principal political positions
Israel’s Coping with the al-Aqsa Intifada: A Critical Review
The al-Aqsa intifada erupted as a grassroots uprising and was fought between an occupying state and a people aspiring for national liberation and self-determination.*1 According to international law, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were held under “belligerent occupation,”*2 where the ruling power is the military command – especially since Israel retained authority over much of the area, as well as control over the access routes in and out of the territories. Israel and the Palestinians understood the essence of the violence, which evolved from an uprising to an armed conflict, differently: once it escalated, Israel saw it as an existential conflict*3 imposed on it, and therefore used all the military means it deemed necessary to protect itself and to “exact a price” from the Palestinians. The Palestinians initially saw the violence as a legitimate popular uprising against the occupying party, with the goal of breaching the political stalemate and gaining independence. From their point of view, it was an asymmetrical conflict: Israel resorted to its definitive military superiority, which could only be offset with “significant operations” (amliyat naweiya), such as suicide attacks.
