During the summer, as Newt Gingrich’s presidential campaign appeared to be sputtering due to a lack of funds, many in the media began to ask why he thought he could win with no money. His reasonable answer—the only possible answer under the circumstances—was that he was going to pull a McCain. In other words, he would use the debates, along with the free campaign stops presented by political TV and talk radio programs, to present his ideas directly to the voters, which is to say without benefit of a significant team on the ground.
Sure enough, he seems to have been successful so far. His rhetorical style, developed, like McCain’s, over many years as both an elected official and a media-hound, has served him well. This is particularly true in the debates. Early on, when everyone assumed he was no threat to their own preferred candidate, it was easy for audiences to cheer his articulate, well-scripted zingers. As a result, everyone’s auditory memory of the August through October debates resounds with splashes of applause for Newt’s witty retorts to over-eager moderators, his satisfying cannon shots at the entire debate format, and his easy command of facts and figures.
He also benefitted from the fact that, as a perceived also-ran, the moderators, as well as other candidates, trod lightly on him, preferring to focus their time—and in the case of the moderators, the majority of important questions and follow-ups—on Romney, Perry, and, more recently, Cain. This meant that Newt’s strength, the great sound bite, was all he was asked to offer during most of the debates. He could cherry-pick the issues on which he would expound, thus speaking mostly on issues where he happened to be properly prepared. Thus, from near the bottom of the pack, he has brilliantly cashed-in on being the man everyone would be willing to have as a vice president. After all, if we prefer a Washington outsider, then won’t we also need someone with the skills and knowledge of an old hand to help the new man adjust? And if we could accept him as VP, then...?
Protected by pity or seeming insignificance, served well by his media-savvy and English skills, he has suddenly found himself as a real contender, at least according to the polls.
There is one other important way that his campaign resembles McCain’s 2008 primary bid: The perceived frontrunner is Mitt Romney, a man many conservatives find flat and unsatisfying. Most Republican primary voters are desperately hoping for an alternative to Romney. This serves anyone well who can articulate a strong position on any issue of importance to conservatives that distinguishes him from Romney. In McCain’s case, it was foreign policy, where the Iraq surge, a policy encouraged by McCain against the general resistance of the Republican establishment, was bearing remarkable fruit, thus enhancing his image by obscuring the many areas where conservatives had doubts about him. These doubts leapt to the fore during the race against Obama, and helped to bury him by way of lukewarm support from the Republican base. In Gingrich’s case, the advantage over Romney is in conservative rhetoric.
The favorable conditions for Gingrich, in addition to the recent concerns about Herman Cain’s character—which have peculiarly metamorphosed into concerns about his competence and policy acumen—have allowed Gingrich to wheedle himself into the thick of things. Now, his money problems will likely be resolved, as some Anyone-But-Romney donors, having watched all the other contenders rise and seemingly fall in support, begin to see him as their best bet, particularly given the late date on the pre-New Hampshire calendar.
Early in the campaign, many conservatives dismissed Gingrich on the basis of his considerable baggage. They disliked him for many of the same reasons that they disliked Romney. However, he plays the conservative role far better than does Romney, and this, along with the confluence of lucky circumstances described above, has caused an almost complete reversal of conservative—and perhaps even Tea Party—opinion about him. Originally, the view seemed to be, “He speaks well, and I agree with his words on a lot of topics, but there are too many reasons to wonder about his sincerity or consistency on some very important issues.” In a matter of two months, there seems to be a rising tide of conservative opinion to this effect: “There are some areas where I have concerns about his past positions, but overall, he speaks well, and I agree with him on most issues.”
The popular image of this subtle but significant change is found in Mark Levin, who, in the summer, was focused on Gingrich’s shortcomings, but now speaks mostly in positive terms about the man, although continuing to express some nagging concerns. Most recently, he has explicitly said that he would much prefer Gingrich to Romney, as though to emphasize a wide credibility or legitimacy gap between the two candidates.
Perhaps this is a relevant moment, before conservatives in general take the precipitous flight into Gingrich’s camp as their last hope, to focus the light once again on some of the reasons they were nervous about him in the first place. Let’s begin with one stark example.
In 2007, Gingrich appeared together with John Kerry, who, along with Hillary Clinton, helped to originate the clever shift in terminology from “global warming” to “global climate change” as a way of escaping the inconvenient truth that temperatures had ceased to rise while CO2 levels had risen ever higher. Kerry’s involvement is relevant, as the clever name change suggested a desire to keep an issue alive for political reasons, when an important part of its empirical support had begun to wither in an undeniable way. By way of comparison, when the view that Earth is at the center of the universe ceased to be a viable theory, it was rejected by scientists. Yet we still call the theory ‘geocentrism’. If there had been political value in maintaining it somehow, the Copernican-era equivalent of the UN would have begun speaking about the “Earth-not-on-the-absolute-outer-extreme-of-the-universe theory”, and denying that ‘geocentrism’ was ever a proper name for the theory at all.
Within this Kerry/Gingrich anti-debate-like session, the following exchange took place:
JK: What would you say to Senator Inhofe, and others in the Senate, who are resisting the ‘even science’?
NG: My message, I think, is that the evidence is sufficient that we should move towards the most effective possible steps to reduce carbon-loading in the atmosphere...
JK: ... and do it urgently. Now?
NG: And do it urgently. Yes.
And then, after explaining that the reason conservatives resist this idea is that climate has typically been used as an argument for bigger government, Gingrich attempted to build a bridge, as Kerry nodded approvingly, according to script:
NG: ... Part of the reason I am delighted... to be here with Senator Kerry is, I think there has to be a ‘green conservatism’.... and now to have a dialogue about, ‘what’s the most effective way to solve it?’ rather than to get into a fight over whether or not to solve it.
“The evidence is sufficient.” The evidence of what, exactly? Even McCain, who took hell from conservatives over his climate change position, was more circumspect, arguing that while there may be reason to doubt the veracity of global warming, as long as it is even possible, we ought to take precautionary steps.
Gingrich needs to do more than sweet-talk his way out of such a statement, not to mention the cutely bipartisan staging of his coming-out party. Yes, politicians can change positions. But Gingrich was a very seasoned Washingtonian by 2007, not a careless rookie. And this was a very elaborately-designed speaking opportunity, with Gingrich’s argument for a ‘green conservatism’ as its main purpose. Global warming, in the minds of many Tea Party conservatives and others, is more than merely a mistaken position. It is part of a strategy to achieve leftist and supranational goals. Gingrich’s apology for global warming, and attempt to draw conservatives into accepting it, needs to be explained.
And that’s merely question number one.
